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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditional approaches to psychotherapy hold forth the offer of 
extensive and meaningful changes in behavior as the outcome of engaging 
in treatment. Yet over the past twenty-five years many writers have 
interpreted the available evidence as failing to bear out this promise. 
It was Eysenck (1952) who provided a focus for subsequent debate and 
research, when he concluded that psychotherapy was no more beneficial 
than the passing of time. More recent reviews have pointed out the 
rather equivocal support for traditional techniques in the literature. 
Taking two examples, Truax and Carkhuff (1967) agree substantially with 
Eysenck (1952, 1960), while the conclusion of Bergin (1971) is that 
"moderately positive" results accrue from therapy. 
Considering the breadth'of the claims for influence over human be-
havior, though, evidence that measurable and durable change results from 
psychotherapy is surprisingly sparse in the literature. Those research-
ers who have managed to document the effects of treatment have typically 
shown a willingness to state very specific criteria. This seems to be. 
most true of the behavior modifers, who tend to forego the global aims 
of traditional therapy in favor of the intensive study of specific and 
observable behaviors. 
Behavior modification is a method for controlling behavior that is 
based on the principles of operant conditioning, developed in large part 
l 
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by B. F. Skinner (1938). As an experimental science, operant condition-
ing is concerned with the modification of the frequency of a bit of 
behavior by its consequences. Behavior is thus understood by knowing 
what factors modify it. As a therapeutic tool, behavior modification 
has sought to concentrate on changing specific behaviors by altering the 
consequences of that behavior. For instance, if a behavior is consis-
tently rewarded (reinforced), then its frequency can be expected to in-
crease. Behavior that fails to produce reinforcing consequences in some 
form will eventually disappear (extinguish) . 
In this study the principles of operant conditioning were applied 
in a group therapy format. Group techniques themselves are often viewed 
as an alternative to traditional, individual therapy. Yalom (1970), a 
chief proponent, notes that a primary advantage of groups is that they 
allow members to interact therapeutically with a number of others simul-
taneously. In a sense the group provides a social microcosm which 
fosters more adaptive learning. Combining the methods of operant condi-
tioning and group therapy, it is believed, will permit clear specifica-
tion of behaviors and goals within a setting conducive to therapeutic 
learning. 
This design has already been successfully implemented in the work 
of Fromme, Whisenant, Susky and Tedesco (1974). The technique used a 
mechanical reinforcer to teach affective verbalizations to leaderless, 
four-person groups of college students. The verbalizations included 
various statements thought to be important in psychotherapeutic pro-
cesses. Using this method subjects were trained to engage in open and 
personal interaction. This general method was used in the present study, 
and is further detailed in Methodology. 
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Fromme, Stammel and Duvall (1976) studied the effectiveness of the 
operant group technique in producing verbal learning that was resistant 
to extinction and capable of generalizing. It was felt these were cru-
cial if the technique was to meet two criteria often applied to therapy 
outcome: durability and flexibility. Any new behavior resulting from 
psychotherapy must be available outside the therapy setting on a long-
term basis. Krasner (1965) has argued that verbal conditioning could be 
analogous to psychotherapy, and whether or not it resisted extinction and 
generalized was thought to be a good test. The finding of Fromme et al. 
(1976) was that learning generated by their operant group technique met 
both criteria. · 
One measure of positive change used in the present study was, of 
course, the rate at which subjects used the affective verbalizations. 
However, the specificity of these "categories" could be interpreted as 
producing learning too narrow to be truly therapeutic. This general 
criticism is often leveled by proponents of traditional therapies. If 
the technique could be shown to impact on more global measures of change, 
though, further assurance of its usefulness would be gained. With this 
in mind, three separate instruments were selected to be used as a means 
of determining the effect of the operant method on what could be consid-
ered more traditional personality variables. 
The first selected was the Modified Jourard Self-Disclosure Ques-
tionnaire (Jourard and Lasakow, 1958), which is a means of measuring 
one's willingness to disclose oneself to another. The second was the 
Personal Orientation Inventory (Shostrum, 1964), an attempt to operation-
alize "self-actualizing" attributes. The third was the Group Perceptions 
Test (Fromme, 1976), a scale providing "self and other" perceptions which 
can be combined to provide measures of group feeling and perception. 
The value of these scales in assessing therapeutic outcome is discussed 
in following sections of this study. 
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In brief, this study represents an expansion of earlier research 
using the Fromme et al. (1974) method. An attempt was made to determine 
whether previous results could be replicated with an increased number of 
subjects, and if the generalization effects would endure over a longer 
period of time. Additional validation of the operant method was 
attempted through the use of three self-report instruments. 
The Review of Literature is intended to provide support for the 
following assumptions: 
1. That conditioning of verbal behavior is possible and can be 
accomplished through a variety of techniques • 
.2. That verbal behavior can be a credible analogue to the process 
of psychotherapy. 
3. That a group setting is a useful way to facilitate changes in 
behavior. 
4. That the Fromme et al. technique (1974) can be used to generate 
meaningful changes in behavior and that this learning will generalize to 
new situations. 
5. That the Jourard Self-Disclosure Questionnaire, Personal Orien-
tation Inventory, and Group Perceptions Test are useful methods of evalu-
ating changes due to the operant technique. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Conditioning of Verbal Behavior 
The study of verbal conditioning began many decades ago with the 
work of Humphreys (1939) and Razran (1949) . The research of Greenspoon 
(1954, 1955), though, seems to have been responsible for stimulating 
much of the current interest in the area. He was able to modify the 
probability of occurrence for a response class of plural nouns by using 
verbal approval in the :Corm of "nunm-hmm." Since this early study the 
number of operant variables under investigation has expanded to include 
various response classes, extinction rates, different types of rein-
forcers and generalization effects. Over the past few years several re-
views of the area have appeared (Krasner, 1958, 1962, 1965; Salzinger, 
1959; Greenspoon, 1962; Williams, 1966; Holz and Azrin, 1966; Hersen, 
1967; and Kanfer, 1968). 
The. earliest studies tended to target simple and specific response 
classes consisting of parts of speech, such as pronouns (Taffel, 1955), 
verbs (Sarason, 1955), nouns and pronouns (Mock, 1957; Krasner, 1958; 
Spielberger and DeNike, 1962). In time broader verbalizations like ex-
pressions of feeling and self-references were employed. A representative 
list would include self-references (Rogers, 1960; Phelan, Tang and 
Heckmat, 1967; Dickens and Fordham, 1967; Powell, 1968; Myrick, 1969; 
5 
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Ince, 1970), affect words or statements (Ullman, Krasner and Collins, 
1961; Williams and Blanton, 1968; Ince, 1968; and Merbaum and Lukens, 
1968), affective self-references (Merbaum, 1963; Hoffnung, 1969, and 
Heckmat, 1971), independence and affection statements (Moos, 1963), and 
self-disclosing statements (Mann, 1972; and Olson, 1972). Fromme, 
Whisenant, Susky and Tedesco (1974), Fromme and Close (1975), Fromme, 
Stommel and Duvall (1976) modified affective, feedback, and empathy 
statements. 
Quite a variety of reinforcers have also been studied: among them 
the "mmm-hmm" sound of Greenspoon (1954, 1955), gestural cues (Hock, 
1957; Eckman, 1958; Drasner, 1959), and mechanical cues such as lights 
(Ball, 1952; Greenspoon, 1954; Nutman, 1957; and Hastorf, 1968), sound 
(Ball, 1952; Greenspoon, 1954; and McNair, 1957), and a combination of 
' 
sound, lights, and serial counters (Fromme, Whisenant, Susky and Tedesco, 
1974; Fromme and Close, 1975; Fromme, Stommel and Duvall, 1976). 
Verbal Conditioning as an Analogue 
to Psychotherapy 
Although some of these studies were conducted in a "quasi-
therapeutic" setting, few have used a conditioning paradigm with deliber-
ate therapeutic intent. An exception was Ullman, Krasner and Collins 
(1961). In their study psychiatric patients already in group therapy 
were asked to participate in four story-telling sessions; during which 
affect-laden words were: (1) reinforced in a positive-personal manner; 
(2) reinforced in an impersonal-unstructured manner; or (3) not rein-
,,,, 
forced. Ratings by group therapists before and after experimental ses-
sions indicated that only those individuals receiving positive personal 
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reinforcement made any gains in the adequacy of their interaction with 
other group members. 
Taking another approach, Williams and Blanton (1968) told their sub-
jects they were being referred for psychotherapy. Eighteen nonpsychotic 
patients were assigned to three treatment groups. One group was verbally 
reinforced for "feeling" statements, another for statements without feel-
ing content, and the third group was given traditional psychotherapy. 
After nine sessions the percentage of feeling statements had increased 
for the group receiving selective reinforcement and the traditional 
therapy group, while the group reinforced for nonfeeling words had shown 
a slight decrease in feeling statements. In this study, verbal condi-
tioning was as effective as psychotherapy in eliciting feeling statements. 
Even though verbal conditioning procedures have been used to study 
or approximate the processes of psychotherapy, there remains a question 
regarding their sufficiency as an analogue. The issue of the degree of 
relationship centers around two considerations: (1) How similar are the 
processes and settings? (2) How does a change in verbal behavior medi-
ate change in complex life patterns? 
Regarding the first question, Krasner (1965) has pointed out the 
many shared features of verbal conditioning and psychotherapy. He notes 
that they are both situations involving the exercise of social influence, 
that they are both interaction processes involving lawful variables, and 
that they both effect changes in behavior that are at the same time ex-
tensive and durable. 
The issue of how a change in verbal behavi~r might contribute to 
overall client improvement is much more complex. In selected cases the 
verbal behavior is itself the target symptom, as in the work of Houghton 
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(1964) with delusional speech, and van Sommers (1968) with stammerers. 
As a rule, though, verbal behavior is not the object of such specific 
interventions. However, the traditional viewpoint in psychotherapy has 
long held one of the most important factors in client improvement to be 
the chance for verbally exploring and explaining oneself within a frame-
work of therapeutic rapport. Although specifics vary according to the-
oretical positions, they have in common the notion that the symbolic 
properties of language mediate between verbal and other behaviors in 
bringing about change. 
Group Therapy 
Another major alternative to traditional, individual psychotherapy 
of interest to this study is actually a number of various techniques 
collectively referred to as "group therapy." It is currently available 
across a wide range of theoretical approaches, from psychoanalysis to 
encounter therapy. As already noted its main advantages are thought to 
be economy and an opportunity for therapeutic interaction with a number 
of other people. Bednar and Lawlis (1971), in their review of empirical 
group research, concluded that group therapy is an effective means toward 
client improvement. 
Yalom (1970) contends that group therapy provides a social microcosm 
which permits trying out new behaviors, with the consequence that emo-
tionally corrective experiences are fostered. For a therapeutic experi-
ence to occur, he argues, it is necessary that group members spontaneously 
express their feelings toward others in the group. Feedback and consen-
sual validation are also requirements, so that the appropriateness of 
one's behavior may be safely tested. Yalom (1970) investigated critical 
incidents which group members had described as helpful. Studying 20 
successful therapy cases, he found three common occurrences singled out 
by the client as the most important in their therapy. These were: (1) 
the strong expression of negative affect to others; (2) the expression 
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of strong positive affect to others; and (3) an incident, usually involv-
ing self-disclosure, that involved them more intensely with their group. 
Group techniques and conditioning principles have been successfully 
combined in some instances. Liberman (1970, 1971) reinforced certain 
types of statements thought to be important in developing group cohesive-
ness (also termed intimacy, solidarity or affection). In the experimental 
group the therapist used social reinforcement techniques to facilitate 
cohesiveness, while a therapist closely matched in several traits used a 
more conventional approach with the control group. The experimental group 
members showed more signs of cohesiveness, increased independence from the 
therapist, quicker symptom remission, and greater personality change than 
the control group. 
Most group studies have relied on the efforts of a leader to provide 
direction for group members. Even so, a paper by Wolf (1961) has sug-
gested that therapists may become the focus of attention in the group, 
encouraging an antitherapeutic dependency upon the leader. Salzberg 
(1961) found that the level of verbal interaction among group members was 
inversely related. to the frequency of the therapist's interventions. 
Therapist-led groups also present the problem of controlling for indivi-
dual differences, a frequent source of bias in group therapy research. 
In an attempt to avoid the problems associated with therapist-led 
groups, some studies have used a mechanical feedback apparatus in place 
of the leader. Hastorf (in Krasner and Ullman, 1968) used sets of lights 
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in successfully manipulating the leadership hierarchy in four-person 
groups. Krueger (1971) employed light flashes, which could later be ex-
changed for primary reinforcers, to modify behavior in a therapeutic 
direction. She found the modification effective when reinforcement was 
administered by a fellow group member. Guiterrez and Eisenmann (1971) 
conditioned groups of delinquent boys using a mechanical buzzer. 
Generalization of Verbal Conditioning 
Traditional therapies assume that more adaptive behavior learned in 
the actual sessions becomes available to the person indefinitely and 
without situational constraints. For a behavior to remain specific to 
therapy settings would not meet any reasonable criteria of successful 
treatment. For verbal operant conditioning to succeed as an analogue to 
psychotherapy, the new learning it produces must also be resistant to 
changes of time, place and context. In.the language of conditioning 
theory it must "transfer" or "generalize" to new situations. Demonstra-
tion of generalization effects is a crucial test for verbal conditioning. 
As it happens, reviews of the area reveal that the evidence for such 
effects is neither extensive nor conclusive (Greenspoon, 1962; Williams~ 
1964; Kanfer and Phillips, 1970; Levine and Fasnacht,.1974). 
Many of the studies investigating generalization have failed to 
demonstrate the predicted effe.cts. Rogers (1960), in a quasi-therapeutic 
setting,was able to condition self-references in 36 male college students 
using "mmm-hmm" and head nods as reinforcers. In six 10-minute sessions 
positive self-references were reinforced as subjects freely discussed 
. . I 
their personality characteristics. Generalization, defined as pre- and 
post-test differences on a battery of personality tests, failed to occur. 
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Using these same reinforcers Moos (1963) successfully conditioned inde-
pendence and affection statements in 20 female undergraduates, but failed 
to find significant generalization effects. 
Lanyon (1967) attempted to condition statements of "content" versus 
"affect" during 20-minute sessions in which subjects were asked to freely 
recall childhood experiences. Two other control groups were administered 
noncontingent reinforcement at a constant interval. Immediately after 
the sessions, subjects were taken to a different room and asked by a dif-
ferent experimenter to complete a 100-item sentence completion blank 
orally. This second part of the task constituted a test for generaliza-
tion. Results showed that content words could be conditioned by this 
method, but affect words could not. No generalization was detected. 
Other researchers have been more successful in producing evidence 
for the generalization of verbal learning. Ullman, Krasner and Collins 
(1961) conditioned emotional words in three groups of ten "continued 
treatment" hospitalized males. Subjects were seen four times over two 
weeks, during which time they were asked to make up five-minute stories 
to pictures depicting neutral scenes conunon to a hospital setting. In 
the Positive-Personal condition subjects were reinforced by "mmrn-hnun" as 
they used emotional words: in the Impersonal-Unstructured group, a 
mechanical counter was advanced as a reinforcer; and a third group was 
not reinforced. Subjects were evaluated pre- and post-experimentally by 
their group therapist, using a scale to monitor patient behavior. Only 
the Positive-Personal group made a significant improvement in their rat-
ing. Since the behavior rated had transferred from experimental to 
I 
group therapy session, this was interpreted as evidence of generaliza-
tion. 
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In another study Hoffnung (1969) explored the differential effects 
of five forms of therapy-like interventions on the conditioning and 
transfer of affective self-references in a role-played interview. The 
interventions made during 40-minute sessions were designed to provide 
various levels of discriminative cue potency for the subjects, and were, 
from least to most potent: Condition I, "mmm-hmm;" Condition II, Echoic, 
or reflecting the mood and content of the subject's affective self-
reference; Condition III, in which the experimenter restated or rephrased 
subject's statement; Condition IV, combined "mmm-hmm" and echoic; and 
Condition V, combined "mmm-hnnn" and paraphrasing. Innnediately preceding 
and following role-playing, subjects were required to tell three two-
minute stories to Thematic Apperception Test Cards. Results indicated 
that affective self-references increased for all five experimental condi-
tions, with no differential effects between them. Transfer of training 
to the TAT task was demonstrated by the greater production of affective 
self-reference by experimental subjects as compared with control sub-
jects. 
Modification of "Here and Now" Affect, Feedback, 
and Empathy Verbalizations in Leaderless Groups 
Truax and Carkhuff (1967) have gathered a great deal of support for 
the contention that interactions characterized by empathy, nonpossessive 
warmth and genuineness are the most significant factors related to client 
improvement in either individual or group psychotherapy. Along similar 
lines, Yalom (1970) has emphasized that group members need to express 
their feelings toward others as they arise in the group {"here and now"), 
! 
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and that the opportunity to give and receive feedback in testing the 
appropriateness of behavior is an important component of the therapy 
process. 
Bearing these factors in mind, Fromme, Whisenant, Susky and Tedesco 
(1974) sought to use the techniques of verbal operant conditioning as a 
means of enhancing the interaction process of four-person groups com-
posed of college students. They selected five categories of affective 
verbalizations which included statements of immediate feeling, feedback 
and empathy. Both experimental and control subjects were given detailed 
instructions concerning use of the categories during the 60-minute ses-
sions. Experimental subjects were additionally reinforced by means of a 
mechanical counter, with further information about their progress given 
through the use of lights (this method was used in the present study; 
see Methodology for a more detailed explanation). 
Results over one session for all.groups in the two conditions showed 
the experimental groups emitting significantly more reinforceable state-
ments, a mean of 9.75; than the control subjects, 0.85. A test of the 
reliability of judging these categories yielded an index of 93% agree-
ment, suggesting that these categories could be reliably judged. In a 
partial replication of this study, Fromme and Close (1974) found that 
groups with the feedback apparatus average 10.04 responses per person,. 
and groups without only 2.58. 
Since these initial studies, the Fromme et al. (1974) technique has 
been used to investigate a number of different variables important to 
verbal conditioning procedures. Fromme, Stomme,1 and Duvall (1976) em-
ployed the technique in examining the effects of varying schedules of 
reinforcement on acquisition, extinction and generalization. Two groups 
I 
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of four subjects were given 10 one-hour sessions, during which one group 
was maintained on continuous reinforcement, the other on variable ratio 
schedules. The eight subjects were then each placed with three untrained 
subjects, within one week of the last reacquisition trial. 
Results showed that the group on the continuous reinforcement sched-
ule were resistant to extinction, while the variable ratio group was not. 
This finding is exactly opposite to the usual effects of reinforcement 
schedules, suggesting that a variable schedule was unsuitable for such 
response categories. Generalization effects were demonstrated for the 
eight original subjects; their scores from the generalization sessions 
were not only statistically significant, but showed very little overlap 
with scores from baseline sessions. This suggests the technique had 
psychological impact as well as statistical significance. Scores of the 
untrained subjects in the generalization session provided further evi-
dence for the power of the technique. These subjects had a mean response 
total significantly greater than the original subjects in the baseline 
session, indicating that exposure to a trained subject had a measurable 
effect on the response rates of untrained subjects. 
Following a suggestion by Fronune, Stonunel and Duvall (1976) that a 
logical next step might be utilizing the technique with a psychiatric 
population, Smallwood (1975) used it to facilitate interpersonal open-
ness in four-person groups composed of patients. Three groups were 
assigned in each of two conditions, reinforcement and control, which met 
for five 45-minute sessions across two and one-half weeks. After an 
initial baselines session for both conditions, the reinforcement groups 
received continuous reinforcement in the manner already described. Con-
trol groups met for four sessions and attempted to follow the detailed 
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instructions. Then, as a test of possible generalization effects, one 
member of each experimental and control groups was placed in a baseline-
type session with three untrained subjects. These groups met within one 
week of the last regular session. Three different instruments were ad-
ministered after baseline and again after the last acquisition session. 
Scores on the pre- and post-test measures were then compared. The 
instruments were: (1) the Mooney Problem Checklist; (2) the Semantic 
Differential for "Real and Ideal Self" discrepancies; and (3) the Modi-
fied Jourard Self-Disclosure Questionnaire. 
Results for reinforcement data further supported the effectiveness 
of the Fromme et al. (1974) technique. Experimental groups emitted sig-
nificantly more reinforceable responses than did control groups. The 
test for generalization proved significant, demonstrating transfer of 
training to a new setting. Results for data derived from the three in-
struments found that only one recorded a significant change for the. 
experimental groups between the two administrations: the modified Jourard 
Self-Disclosure Questionnaire. This supports the operant technique as ~ 
means of increasing self-disclosing behavior, and it suggests in turn 
that the scale is a sensitive enough instrument to detect therapeutic 
changes in behavior. 
Self-Disclosure and the Modified Jourard 
Self-Disclosure Questionnaire 
The act of revealing one's feelings to others has been tradition-
ally viewed as a positive trait by several major•personality theorists 
(Fromm, 1947; Sullivan, 1953; Rogers, 1968; Maslow, 1971). A more cur-
rent advocate of interpersonal transparency, Jourard (1971), contends 
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that the fear of allowing others to know one's true feelings underlies 
most human malaise. The chief benefit from traditional therapies, he 
believes, is that they allow the airing of suppressed or repressed 
material (Jourard, 1964). From his reasoning it follows that any therapy 
technique which increases self-disclsoure is producing beneficial results. 
Jourard and Lasakow (1968) developed an instrument to measure the 
amount of disclosure that a person perceives himself to have made to 
another person. It is a 60-item, forced-choice questionnaire, which can 
be modified to accommodate different "targets," i.e., the person or per-
sons to whom one is disclosing (see Appendix A). As a predictive instru-
ment, the questionnaire has been evaluated differently by various re-
searchers. Some have found that it is indeed capable of predicting self-
disclosing behavior in certain situations (Jourard, 1961; Taylor, 1965; 
Resvick, 1970). Others have reported less positive results (Himmelstein 
and Kimbrough, 1963; Vondracek, 1968; Hurley and Hurley, 1969). When 
considering the question of construct validity, the evidence is more 
clearly positive. The questionnaire seems clearly to measure what it 
purports to--self-disclosure (Burkenne and Mirels, 1970; Jourard, 1971; 
Panyard, 1973). 
Smallwood (1975), interpreting the operant technique as facilitating 
self-disclosure, studied the effects of five training sessions on pre-
and post-scores with a modification of Jourard's questionnaire. The 
modification consisted of reducing the number of items to 30 and changing 
the "target" for disclosure to "people in this group," thereby rendering 
the instrument more suitable for the operant method (see Smallwood, 
1975). Results suggested that the procedure was indeed effective in 
changing self-disclosing behavior, as measured by the questionnaire. 
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Since the instrument seemed appropriate, it was used in the present 
study. Should significant changes be detected, they could be inter-
preted as evidence that an impact on more traditional personality vari-
ables results from the present method of verbal conditioning. The 
questionnaire was one of three instruments used in this study. 
Personal Orientation Inventory 
Another means of assessing the effects of training was Shostrum's 
(1963, 1964) Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) (see Appendix B). It 
is a diagnostic inventory designed to measure personal values related to 
positive mental health. The focus of this instrument is to tap "self-
actualization," a concept attributed primarily to Maslow (1954). Self-
actualization is viewed as a process by which a person becomes increas-
ingly capable of using his abilities in an autonomous, inner-directed 
fashion. Other qualities attributed to self-actualized persons are a 
benevolent view of human nature, efficient use of time, present-
centeredness, and participation in mutually rewarding relationships. 
Understandably, these qualities are often put forth as ideal outcomes 
of psychotherapy. 
Despite considerable theoretical work, the concept of self-
actualization has been criticized as relatively valueless by investiga-
tors. For some time research using the concept had been hampered by 
lack of an operationalized definition. Since development of the POI, 
however, a reasonably valid and reliable measure is thought to exist 
(Shostrum, 1966; Maslow, 1967). It has been used, as a few examples, 
·' 
in clinical studies (Shostrum, 1965; Fox, 1965a; Fox, Knapp and Michael, 
1968), in counseling studies quite extensively (Hood, 1968; Foulds, 
1969abc; McClain, 1970a; Graff and Bradshaw, 1970; Graff, Bradshaw, 
Danish, Austin, and Altekruse, 1970; Heckmat and Theiss, 1971), and in 
studies of school achievement (Pearson, 1966; Leil and Snyder, 1967; 
Lemay and Damm, 1968; Weber, 1970). 
Of particular interest to the present study are some examinations 
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of therapeutic outcome (more exactly outcome of "growth techniques") 
using the POI. Culbert, Clark and Bobele (1968) investigated the effects 
of sensitivity training on pre- and post-session scores. Two groups of 
ten college students were assigned to a 14-week program consisting of one 
two-hour session per week. One group's pre-treatment scores indicated 
they were low self-actualizers, while the other group was composed of 
students with initially high scores. Results indicated that low self-
actualizers changed significantly on four scales, with the high group 
showing no changes. This finding supports the notion that a normal popu-
lation treated by "sensitivity" methods can change sufficiently to be 
·measured by the.POI. In a similar outcome study, but with a marathon-
group foi;:,mat, Guinan and Foulds (1970) found POI scores to have changed 
significantly after a 30-hour weekend session. 
This partial survey provides support for use of the POI as a measure 
of changes toward positive emotional growth resulting from encounter-type 
techniques. The method of Fronune et al. (1974) can be classified in this 
general category, and the POI will be ohe of three instruments, thought 
to measure more traditional personality variables, that will be used in 
this study (see Methodology section for listing of 12 POI scales and 
explanation of administration and scoring). 
···. ll 
. ·~~ 
Interpersonal Perception and the 
Group Perceptions Test 
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The third instrument used in the present study was developed by 
Fromme (1976) as a means of measuring group perceptions and feeling. The 
Group Perceptions Test (Appendix C) was devised to provide data about 
self and other perceptions which could be combined in various ways to 
provide measures of important group qualities. 
The basic concepts used in this approach have their origins in the 
pioneer work of Tagiuri (1958) , who used sociometric techniques to study 
interpersonal feelings in dyads. One of the earliest concepts developed 
was "congruency," or the tendency of individuals to feel about others as 
they perceive others to feel about them. His finding that the phenomenon 
occurred clearly in excess of chance was supported by other work (Force, 
1954; Borgatta, 1954; and Scher, 1955). Although the emergence of con-
gruency in a dyad has several possible psychodynamic explanations (see 
Lorber, 1973), Tagiuri favors the notion that it begins with a simple 
feeling of liking of disliking, rather than with the actual percept of 
how the other feels. 
Two other concepts that have been closely studied are related to 
congruency: accuracy and mutuality. Accuracy is defined as the degree 
to which one can predict the feelings of another, and mutuality is how 
similar the feelings are between members of a dyad. While observations 
indicate that these two exist independently of congruency, a relationship 
does exist in that the presence of any two of the three seems to deter-
mine the presence of the third (Tagiuri, 1958). 
The Group Perceptions Test also owes a conceptual debt to the work 
of Laing (1966). His phenomenological analysis of interpersonal 
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relations focuses on the experience of the person: the perceptions of 
the individual rather than specific behavioral categories. He has devel-
oped a method of measuring these perceptions, which includes the two 
relating persons' views of themselves, the relationship of the other to 
himself, one's own relationship to the other, and the other's relation-
ship to oneself. These relationships can be viewed from a direct per-
spective, or can be further removed, as in metaperspective or meta-
metaperspective. Metaperspective would involve, as an example, the per-
son's view of the other's view of himself, while meta-metaperspective in 
this example would be the person's view of the view of the other's view 
of himself. In the analysis of a relationship it is possible to combine 
these to measure the extent of agreement, understanding, and "realization 
of understanding" between two persons (see Laing, 1966). 
The test utilizes a semantic-differential type of scale in an 
attempt to measure the self, other, and relationship perspectives de-
scribed by Laing (1966). The scales ask the subject to rate: (1) him-
self (his view of himself); (2) the other members (his view of the 
others); (3) how he thinks the others rated him (his view of the others' 
views of him); and (4) how he thinks the others rated themselves (his 
view of the others' views of themselves). The ratings were conducted 
along four dimensions described elsewhere (see Methodology). 
The four points of view can then be combined to form measures of 
group perception, such as those developed by Tagiuri (1958). For exam-
ple, "congruency," defined by him as the tendency to feel about others 
as they are perceived to feel abou.t oneself, can., be derived by comparing 
the rating of the other group members with how one perceives them to 
have rated oneself. The discrepancy can be taken as a congruency score: 
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the smaller the difference the more congruent the viewpoints. Eight 
such measures were devised for use in the present study, as a means of 
measuring the impact of the operant method on group perceptions (Appendix 
D). Scoring is further explained in the Methodology section. 
CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The method of Fromme et al. (1974) has been shown to be an effec-
tive means of facilitating feeling, feedback and empathy statements in 
groups of both college students and psychiatric patients. Conditioning 
of these complex response categories has been repeatedly demonstrated in 
studying traditional operant variables such as acquisition rates, extinc-
tion and generalization. Taken as a whole, these studies suggest that 
this method of verbal operant conditioning is a consistently effective 
tool for changing behavior in a therapeutic direction. 
This conclusion, however, is generally challenged by Levine and 
Fasnacht's (1974) review of the literature. They charge that outcome 
studies of token economy techniques show the learning generated to be 
neither resistant to extinction nor capable of generalization. Further-
more, they point out, cognitive factors play a central role in whether 
the subject decides he is working for extrinsic or intrinsic reasons; 
which in turn determines whether or not the learning is durable. It is 
their view that these factors have been largely ignored by behavior 
modifiers, with the result that any behavioral change tends to remain 
specific to the setting in which it was learned. 
Previous research establishing the present operant technique as' 
resistant to extinction and capable of generalization effects (Fromme, 
Stommel and Duvall, 1976) seems to meet this general criticism of operant 
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research. Yet two aspects of this research also tend to reduce the level 
of assurance that the technique has produced "real" generalization 
effects: the relatively small number of subjects used and the fact that 
tests for generalization have been done within a week of the end of 
training (Smallwood, 1975; Fromme et al., 1976). If equally convincing 
results could be produced with an expanded number of subjects, over a 
longer interim period, the value of the present operant method would be 
even clearer. 
The present study was designed to provide evidence bearing on these 
two considerations, and to examine the effects of the technique on three 
instruments measuring personal and interpersonal variables. The three 
major purposes were: (1) a replication of the findings of the previous 
Fromme et al. studies that the method in fact generates learning, with 
an expanded .number of subjects; (2) an attempt to demonstrate long term 
generalization effects; and (3) an investigation of the effects of train-
ing on self-disclosure, personal orientation and group perceptions, as 
measured by the Modified Jourard Self-Disclosure Questionnaire, the Per-,. 
sonal Orientation Inventory and the Group Perceptions Test, respectively. 
The first major purpose included the expectation that reinforcement 
groups would emit affective verbalizations at a significantly higher 
level than nonreinforcement groups, in all sessions. Also, that rein~ 
forcement subjects would show increased levels of responding across ses-
sions, while nonreinforcement subjects would not. 
The second major purpose, the test for generalization, was accom-
plished by "seeding" trained subjects into groups of naive ones. This 
was done at two different points: immediately after acquisition three 
(for immediate effects), and then 45 days after this (delayed 
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generalization). For immediate sessions, 12 of the 24 original subjects 
(6 reinforcement, 6 nonreinforcement) were randomly selected and paired 
with untrained subjects. This procedure, it was believed, allowed for a 
check of the effects of being in a previous generalization session on 
response levels in the delayed sessions. It was expected that those sub-
jects participating in immediate generalization would perform at higher 
levels, in delayed generalization, than those who had not. The test for 
delayed generalization involved pairing all 24 subjects with three un-
trained ones. 
The third major purpose was an examination of the effects of operant 
training on three instruments: (1) the Modified Jourard Self-Disclosure 
Questionnaire; (2) the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI); and (3) the 
Group Perceptions Test. 
The Jourard and POI were administered to the 24 original subjects 
prior to the experiment (Pre-test) , to the 12 randomly-selected original 
subjects just before immediate generalization session (Post 1), and 
again to all 24 subjects just before the delayed generalization sessions 
(Post 2). The literature supported both of these instruments as sensi-
tive to therapeutic change. It was expected that the operant method 
would result in significant increases in reported willingness to self-
disclose, and in reports of self-actualizing attributes. Specifically, 
that the mean raw scores for reinforcement subjects would be greater 
than those for nonreinforcement subjects, on both Post 1 and Post mea-
sures. It was also expected that those subjects who participated in the 
first generalization session would score significantly higher on Post 2 
measures than those who had not. 
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The Group Perceptions Test was administered after each session, to 
all subjects. For present purposes, however, results were sampled only 
after acquisition one and three, and after delayed generalization. Rein-
forcement subjects were expected to significantly outperform nonrein-
forcement subjects on all eight measures used. Further, it was felt that 
reinforcement subjects would show more congruency, mutuality, etc. across 
sessions, while nonreinforcement subjects would not. Finally, it was 
hypothesized that the effects of being in generalization one, or not, 
would be reflected in a significant difference between the scores of the 
two groups. 
The hypotheses associated with the three major purposes are stated 
more formally as follows. First was the problem of whether replication 
of previous results with expanded numbers of subjects was possible. The 
hypothesis developed to test this was: 
1. Subjects in reinforcement groups will emit significantly 
more statements fitting the categories than those in non-
reinforcement groups. Further, reinforcement groups will 
show an increasing response rate across sessions, while 
nonreinforcement subjects will not. 
Second, there was the question of producing long term generalization 
effects. Two hypotheses were stated to test this: 
2. Learning generated in reinforcement groups will general-
ize to the delayed generalization sessions, while the 
results of nonreinforcement subjects will not. 
3. Reinforcement subjects who participate in the immediate 
generalization sessions will respond at a significantly 
higher level in G2 than those who do not, while there 
will be no similar effect for the nonreinforcement sub-
jects. 
The remaining three hypotheses dealt with the effects of the operant 
i' 
technique on the three instruments: 
4. Reinforcement subjects will score significantly higher 
on the Modified Jourard Self-Disclosure Questionnaire, 
specifically the Post 2 measure, than nonreinforcement 
subjects. Further, reinforcement subjects will increase 
in self-disclosure from Pre-test to Post measures, while 
nonreinforcement subjects will not. Third, for the Post 
2 measure, those reinforcement subjects who participate 
in the immediate generalization sessions will be more 
self-disclosing than reinforcement subjects who do not, 
while nonreinforcement subjects will show no differen-
tial effect. 
5. Reinforcement subjects will score higher on the 12 scales 
of the Personal Orientation Inventory, Post 2 measure, 
than subjects in nonreinforcement groups. They will also 
show an increase in self-actualizing attributes from Pre-
test to Post measures, nonreinforcement subjects will not. 
Third, those reinforcement subjects who participate in 
the immediate generalization sessions will score better 
on the 12 POI scales, Post 2, than reinforcement subjects 
who do not, while nonreinforcement subjects will fail to 
show a similar effect. 
6. Subjects in the reinforcement condition will show more of 
the eight attributes derived from the Group Perception 
Test than will the nonreinforcement subjects. Further, 
reinforcement subjects will significantly increase across 
sessions, while nonreinforcement subjects will not. 
Finally, those reinforcement subjects participating in 
the immediate generalization sessions will show more of 
these eight attributes after the delayed generalization 
sessions, while nonreinforcement subjects will not show 
any such differential effect. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Subjects 
The subjects were volunteers taken from freshman and sophomore 
psychology classes at Oklahoma State University. Since 24 of the total 
132 subjects were required to obligate themselves for a period of approx-
imately two and one-half months, individual interviews were conducted to 
determine whether or not such a degree of commitment was possible. Pre-
treatment measures for the POI and Jourard were taken at the time of the 
interview. During the selection process, any questions concerning the 
general nature of the experiment were answered straightforwardly. Addi-
tional selection criteria included omitting those with previous encounter 
group experience and avoiding assignment of subjects with prior acquaint-
ance to the same group. Class credit was given, proportional to the 
amount of participation in the study. 
The original 24 subjects were randomly chosen and assigned to six 
four-person groups, with the stipulation that there be at least one of 
either sex in each group. These six groups were then randomly assigned 
to reinforcement and nonreinforcement conditions, three groups each. 
These subjects then participated in three acquisition sessions spread 
over one-and one-half weeks. One-.half of the subjects were then randomly 
selected for an immediate generalization session, conducted within one 
week of the last acquisition session. All 24 subjects then participated 
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in the delayed generalization sessions, after 45 days had elapsed; and 
these were conducted within one week of each other. 
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The remaining 108 subjects were randomly assigned in groups of 
three to the original subjects for the two generalization sessions. In 
the first, 36 untrained subjects and 12 trained subjects combined to 
form 12 groups, 6 in the reinforcement condition and 6 in the nonrein-
forcement condition. For the delayed generalization sessions, 24 trained 
subjects and 72 untrained subjects formed 24 groups, 12 in the reinforce-
ment condition and 12 in the nonreinforcement condition. 
Apparatus and Procedures 
The experimental room was 12 x 15 with a one-way mirror centered in 
one wall. Subjects were seated in a semi-circular fashion around a small 
table, facing the mirror. Group interaction was also monitored through a 
microphone on the table. The first acquisition session for reinforcement 
subjects was videotaped for use in checking rater reliability. In the 
reinforcement group sessions, a four-channel relay control panel was used 
to record those instances where a member's statement was evaluated as 
fitting one of the reinforcement categories. As the response was re-
corded a digital counter in front of the subject advanced, making an 
audible click. Additional feedback in the reinforcement sessions was 
given by a red light mounted on the subjects' counters. This light was 
used to provide discriminative cues in the following two instances: (1) 
all four were automatically flashed by an interval timer whenever three 
minutes elapsed with no member having emitted a .1reinforceable response; 
and (2) a subject's light was switched on as he fell ten or more behind 
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the coW1t of the leading subject, and was turned off when the difference 
reverted to nine. 
The six groups of original subjects met separately for the three 
acquisition sessions. In the reinforcement sessions, reinforcement was 
applied on a 100%, continuous schedule. The nonreinforcement groups did 
not receive reinforcement, but those responses fitting the categories 
were recorded by the experimenter. 
For the first generalization session 12 of the first 24 subjects 
were selected at random. These 12 were then paired with 3 randomly-
chosen, randomly-grouped subjects who were unfamiliar with the procedure. 
These 12 groups of 4 then met within one week of the last acquisition 
session, as scheduling would allow. No reinforcement was given during 
generalization sessions. These 12 original subjects were administered 
the POI and Jourard, Post 1, just prior to the first generalization 
sessions. 
The test for delayed generalization, on the other hand, was carried 
out using all 24 original subjects. Following a lapse of 45 days, all 
subjects were again matched with 3 new subjects, forming 24 groups of 4. 
These sessions were conducted within one and one-half weeks after the 
45-day period. Again, only instructions were given. The POI and Jourard 
were administered to the 24 original subjects just prior to these ses-
sions, Post 2. 
The Group Perceptions Test was administered to each subject immedi-
ately after each session involved in the study. 
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Response Categories 
Responses were the same as those used in the previous Fromme et al. 
studies (Fromme, Whisenant, Susky and Tedesco, 1974; Fromme and Close, 
1976; Fromme, Stammel and Duvall, 1976). These were originally chosen 
to include the expression of current feelings, seeking others' expression 
of feelings, giving and asking for feedback on current behavior, and the 
use of empathy statements. Five categories were used, defined operation-
ally as follows: 
1. Giving Feeling: any verbal expression of one's current feelings 
as elicited by members of the group. This expression must be explicit 
and cannot merely be implied. It does not count for a group member to 
express a feeling, even a current feeling, that was produced by an out-
side situation. This definition also excludes cognitive, conative and 
perceptual state verbalizations such as "I think," "I wish," or "I hope." 
2. Seeking Feeling: asking for information from another group mem-
ber regarding his feelings, as defined in Category 1. 
3. Seeking Feedback: seeking information in regard to the effects 
of one's own behavior on the feelings of the rest of the group members. 
4. Giving Feedback: statements made to another group member de-
scribing or labeling one's own perception of that group member's current 
behavior or the group's behavior in general. 
5. Empathy: any attempt to clarify, by means of verbal labeling, 
the expressed feeling states (as defined in Category. 1) of another mem-
ber, with regard to what transpires in the current situation. 
l 
In the sequence of interaction, only those statements meeting the 
following criteria were defined as reinforceable: (1) those meeting the 
conditions described above; (2) "statement" here is defined as a complete 
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thought, with subject, predicate and object (either explicit or clearly 
implied); (3) the statement must add or seek new information about the 
current situation and/or accompanying subjective states. Instruction 
cards (Appendix E) summarizing the five response categories were taped 
to the discussion table in front of each subject. 
Instructions 
After being seated in the first session and both generalization 
sessions, subjects were given the same set of detailed instructions 
(Appendix F) suggesting the desirability of sharing one's feelings, 
being empathic, and providing direct feedback to others. Definitions 
and illustrative examples were given for each of the categories. The 
overall task was explained as· "getting to know each other on a personal 
basis," which the subjects were requested to do by using the categories. 
They were informed of being monitored and observed. Before the second 
and third acquisition sessions, subjects were given a brief reminder of 
their task. 
In the reinforcement condition, an explanation of the feedback 
apparatus was included. Its function was described as a means of allow-
ing the experimenter to be less intrusive, and as allowing. them to be-
come more self-reliant. In the nonreinforcement condition, only 
instructions exhorting the use of the categories was given (see Appendix 
F for distinction) . 
A warm-up procedure similar to that used by Fromme and Close (1976) 
was conducted prior to the first acquisition, immediate generalization, 
and delayed generalization (it was at these points that group members 
were "strangers"). The four subjects were pair'ed up and asked to hold 
32 
hands while looking into each others' eyes for about 15 seconds. They 
were then asked to verbalize current affective states, which were evalu-
ated by the experimenter as fitting or not fitting the response cate-
gories. This procedure was thought to provide a brief learning 
experience whereby the categories could be more easily recognized. 
Measures and Statistical Analyses 
Affective Verbalizations 
Although the present operant method was developed using college 
students (Fronune et al., 1974), it has also been successfully imple-
mented with psychiatric patients (Smallwood, 1975). The value of the 
technique lies in its reliability in producing beneficial behavioral 
changes. If in the present study training proved to be effective with 
larger numbers of subjects, over a greater delay of generalization 
period, then the hypotheses concerning efficacy and replicability would 
have been supported. 
In other words, analysis of the data should show that: (1) subjects 
in the reinforcement condition should emit significantly more reinforce-
able responses than the nonreinforcement subjects, across all sessions; 
(2) reinforcement subjects should show a significantly increasing rate 
of responding across acquisition sessions, and a generalization effect 
in delayed generalization, while nonreinforcement subjects should not 
vary significantly from bas.eline (acquisition one) levels of responding; 
(3) those subjects in the reinforcement groups who participate in the 
inunediate generalization (Gl) sessions should respond at a higher rate 
in the delayed generalization (G2) than those reinforcement subjects who 
do not. There should be no significant difference found between non-
reinforcement subjects due to Gl-yes or Gl-no. 
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To test these three hypotheses, a three-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) (2x2x4) with repeated measures on the sessions factor was used. 
The three independent variables were: (1) reinforcement versus nonrein-
forcement; (2) four sessions, including the three acquisition and one 
delayed generalization session; and (3) Gl-yes versus Gl-no. Four groups 
of subjects were formed by combining the two nonrepeated factors, rein-
forcement and generalization one, yes or no. For each of these four 
groups there was a total of six subjects. 
Modified Jourard Self-Disclosure Questionnaire 
Jourard and Lasakow (1958) devised a self-disclosure questionnaire 
for judging the amount of personal information an individual states he 
is willing to disclose to another. Research has tended to support this 
instrument as valid. A modified version of this scale was used in the 
present study, the modification being that only 30 of the original 60 
items were used (see Appendix A). 
All 24 original subjects were asked to complete the questionnaire 
on two separate occasions: before the first acquisition (Pre-test), and 
just prior to delayed generalization (Post 2). Only the 12 randomly-
selected subjects made up Post 1, taken prior to inunediate generaliza-
tion. Since the other group members were to be strangers on each 
occasion, the "target" for these self-disclosures was stated as ". 
to a group composed of yourself and three other ,college students with 
whom you are unacquainted, whose stated purpose is to get to know each 
other on a personal basis." Subjects answered each item with one of 
the following: 
A. Would tell these people nothing about this aspect of me. 
B. Would talk in general terms about this item. 
C. Would talk in full and complete detail about this item 
to these people. 
D. Would lie or misrepresent myself to these people about 
this item. 
A self-disclosure score was then computed according to the following 
rating scale: 
Answered with A: a score of zero was given. 
Answered with B: a score of one was given. 
Answered with C: a score of two was given. 
Answered with D: a score of zero was given. 
The individual score was derived by totaling the ratings, with the 
possible total ranging from zero to 60. 
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The following effects on reported self-disclosure from the operant 
technique were hypothesized: (1) subjects in reinforcement conditions 
should score significantly higher in self-disclosure in delayed general-
ization than the nonreinforcement subjects; (2) the reinforcement sub-
jects should increase in self-disclosure from Pre-test to Post 2 testings, 
while the nonreinforcement subjects should not show this effect; and (3) 
the Gl-yes subjects in the reinforcement groups should score significant-
ly higher than the Gl-no subjects, on the Post 2 measure, while the 
Gl-yes versus Gl-no subjects in nonreinforcement conditions should not 
be significantly different. 
As a test of these hypotheses, a three-way analysis of variance' 
(ANOVA) (2x2x2), with repeated measures on the sessions factor, was 
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performed. The three independent variables were: (1) reinforcement 
versus nonreinforcement; (2) Pre-test and Post 2; and (3) Gl-yes versus 
Gl-no. Four groups of subjects were formed by combining the two nonre-
peated factors, reinforcement versus nonreinforcement and Gl-yes versus 
Gl-no. For each of these four groups there were six subjects. 
In addition to the above, hypotheses regarding the six reinforce-
ment and nonreinforcement subjects randomly selected for participation 
in Gl were formulated. The following concern the effects of reinforce-
ment on self-disclosure for these subjects: (1) that the reinforcement 
subjects should score significantly better than the nonreinforcement 
subjects; and (2) that reinforcement subjects should increase on Post 1 
and Post 2 measures, while nonreinforcement subjects should not. 
In order to test these hypotheses, a two-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) (2x3), with repeated measures on the sessions factor, was done. 
The two independent variables were: (1) reinforcement versus nonrein-
forcement; and (2) Pre-test, Post 1, and Post 2. There were six subjects 
in each of the two groups. 
Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) 
Shostrum (1964) developed the POI in an attempt to operationalize 
several important humanistic concepts related to Maslow's theory of 
"self-actualization." In this study it was used as an independent mea-
sure of the effects of training with the operant technique. The inven-
tory has 150 items, and is both paired-opposite and forced-choice. It 
yields 12 scales of personal values, concepts and self-percepts thought 
to be of significance in the identification of self-actualization. 
These scales have been discussed in detail by Shostrum (1963), and are 
briefly presented and described as follows: 
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1. Time Ratio-Time Incompetence/Time Competence: measures degree 
to which one is "present-oriented." 
2. Support Ratio-Other/Inner: measures whether reactivity orienta-
tion is basically toward others or self. 
3. Self-Actualizing Value: measures affirmation as a primary value 
of self-actualizing people. 
4. Existentiality: measures ability to situationally or existen-
tially react, without rigid adherence to principles. 
5. Feeling Reactivity: measures sensitivity of responsiveness to 
one's own feelings or needs. 
6. Spontaneity: measures freedom to react spontaneously or to be 
oneself. 
7. Self-Regard: measures affirmation of self because of worth or 
strength. 
B. Self-Acceptance: measures affirmation or acceptance of self 
in spite of weaknesses or deficiencies. 
9. Nature of Man: measures degree of the constructive view of the 
nature of man, masculinity, femininity. 
10. Synergy: measures ability to be synergistic, to transcend 
dichotomies. 
11. Acceptance of Aggression: measures ability to accept one's 
natural aggressiveness as opposed to defensiveness, denial and repression 
of aggression. 
12. Capacity for Intimate Contact: measures ability to develop con-
tactful intimate relationships with other human beings, unencumbered by 
expectations and obligations. 
37 
All of the 24 original subjects completed the POI at Pre-test and 
Post 2, while only the 6 from each reinforcement condition who partici-
pated in the immediate generalization sessions were administered Post 1. 
The POI is essentially self-administering and did not require any special 
adaptation to the requirements of this study. The hand-scoring system 
yields 12 scores for each subject, with an increase representing improve-
ment in that particular attribute. 
It was felt that reinforcement of the five categories would have the 
effect of increasing scores on the 12 POI scales. Consequently, three 
hypotheses were developed: (1) reinforcement subjects' POI scores should 
prove to be significantly higher than those of nonreinforcement subjects, 
at Post 2; (2) reinforcement subjects should show an increase across test-
ings, Pre-test to Post 2, while nonreinforcement subjects should not vary 
significantly; and (3) Gl-yes subjects should have higher scores on Post 2 
than the Gl-no subjects, for the reinforcement groups; no such effect 
should be evident for the nonreinforcement groups. 
As a test of these hypotheses 12 separate analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) (2x2x2), with repeated measures on the sessions factor, were 
performed. Again, the independent variables were: (1) reinforcement 
versus nonreinforcement; (2) Pre-test and Post 2; and (3) Gl-yes versus 
Gl-no. Four groups of six subjects each were formed by combining the 
two nonrepeated factors. 
As with the Jourard data, additional hypotheses were formulated for 
those subjects, six from reinforcement and six from nonreinforcement, 
randomly selected for participation in immediate generalization. The 
'·',. 
following two hypotheses concern the effects of reinforcement or nonrein-
forcement on the 12 POI scale scores: (1) that reinforcement subjects 
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will show significantly higher POI scores than nonreinforcement subjects; 
and (2) that reinforcement subjects should show an increasing trend from 
Pre-test to Post to Post 2, while nonreinforcement subjects should not 
significantly vary. 
In order to test these hypotheses 12 two-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) (2x3), with repeated measures on the sessions factor, were done. 
The two independent variables were: (1) reinforcement versus nonrein-
forcement; and (2) Pre-test, Post 1, and Post 2. There were six subjects 
in each of the two groups. 
Group Perceptions Questionnaire 
The Group Perceptions Questionnaire was developed by Fronune (1976) 
as a means of measuring perceptions and feelings toward the self and 
others among small group members. Conceptually, development of the scale 
owes much to the work of Tagiuri (1958) and Laing (1966) (see Review of 
Literature). It was believed, however, that many of the same concepts 
could be measured through the use of a semantic differential type of 
scale. By asking each group member to rate: (1) how they rate them-
selves; (2) how they rate other group members; (3) how they perceive 
other group members as rating them; and (4) how they perceived other 
group members as rating themselves, various measures of group perception 
and feeling could be derived (see Appendices C and D). The four rated 
dimensions were: (1) friendly/hostile; (2) strong/weak; (3) good/bad; 
and (4) active/passive. 
From a comparison of these ratings, various measures of group per-
,, 
ception and feeling could be derived. Eight measures used in this study 
were: 
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1. Congruency: degree to which one rates others as they are per-
ceived rating oneself {perceived behavior exchange). 
2. Mutuality: degree to which one rates others as they actually 
rate oneself (behavior exchange). 
3. Accuracy: degree to which one can predict how others perceive 
oneself (self-accuracy). 
4. Empathy: degree to which one can predict how others see them-
selves (other accuracy). 
5. Interpersonal Openness: degree to which others can predict 
your rating of them (reflects degree to which one is understood). 
6. Personal Openness: degree to which others can predict one's 
self-concept (reflects degree to which one is understood). 
7. Felt Openness: degree to which one predicts that others agree 
with one's self-perception (reflects degree to which one feels under-
stood). 
8. Realism: degree to which one sees self as others see one 
(others' agreement with self-concept). 
In computing these individual measures, squared deviation scores 
were used. As an example, in deriving a congruency score for one sub-
ject, a comparison was made between the rating given the other three 
group members.by this subject, Item II on the scale (see Appendix C), 
and the scores from Item III, how this subject saw each of the other 
three as rating him. The deviation score for each dimension was then 
totaled for each of the three subjects. The final congruency score for 
the original subject was then obtained from totaling these three scores. 
Since these scores were squared deviations, the smaller the score the 
more congruent subjects would be; the more closely he would have rated 
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others as he perceived them as rating him. The derivation of other mea-
sures is presented in Appendix D. 
It was hypothesized that training in the operant method would have 
the effect of improving the attributes measured by these eight deriva-
tions (decreasing the deviation scores). Specifically, the hypotheses 
were: (1) that subjects in the reinforcement groups would score signi-
ficantly more of the attributes derived from these eight measures than 
nonreinforcement subjects; (2) reinforcement subjects should show a 
significant improvement across sessions while nonreinforcement subjects 
should not; and (3) subjects in the reinforcement groups, Gl-yes, should 
score at higher levels of these attributes than reinforcement groups, 
Gl-no; and there should be no such difference between nonreinforcement, 
Gl-yes versus Gl-no. 
As a test of these hypotheses, a three-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) (2x2x3) with repeated measures on the sessions factor was used. 
The three independent variables were: (1) reinforcement versus nonrein-
forcement; (2) sessions, Al and A3, and delayed generalization; and (3) 
Gl-yes versus Gl-no. Four groups of subjects were formed by combining 
the two nonrepeated factors, reinforcement and immediate generalization, 
yes or no. There were six subjects in each group. 
Rater Reliability 
A check of the reliability of rating the affective verbalizations 
was made between the experimenter, who recorded all reinforceable re-
sponses in this study, and a graduate assistant who was planning to use 
the same system in a later study. A video tape of the first acquisition 
session of the first reinforcement group was made, and this material was 
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divided into 734 scoreable units (see Methodology for definition). 
These were independently numbered and judged by each rater as to whether 
or not they fit one of the five categories. 
Interrater agreement, or how often the raters agreed that a score-
able unit fit a category, was 732 agreements out of the 734 scoreable 
units, 99.7%. Given the relatively small proportion of the total 
responses that were reinforceable (18 of 734), this method of computing 
reliability becomes somewhat uninformative. Therefore, reliability was 
computed a second way: reinforcement agreement, or how many times the 
actual number of reinforcements were in agreement. This figure was 18 
out of 20, or 90.0%, still reflecting a high level of agreement. 
These figures are consistent with those of previous studies, and 
provide further support for the categories being a method which can be 
accurately and reliably judged. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Analysis of Affective Verbalizations 
The mean reinforceable responses for each original group, across 
sessions, are listed in Table I. Figure 1 displays means for reinforce-
ment and nonreinforcement conditions across sessions Al, A2, A3 and G2. 
A three-way analysis of variance with repeated measures on the sessions 
factor was used to compare the groups. The ANOVA summary data appears 
as Table II. 
Since only six randomly-selected subjects from reinforcement condi-
tions and six from nonreinforcement conditions participated in immediate 
generalization, the data from this session was not included in this 
ANOVA. However, the mean reinforceable responses from this immediate 
generalization session for reinforcement groups was 9.50, for nonrein-
forcement groups was 2.67. 
The reinforcement groups had a mean of 5.83 reinforceable responses 
in the first acquisition session, compared with a mean of 1.50 for the 
nonreinforcement groups. In the delayed generalization session (G2), 
the reinforcement groups achieved a mean of 5.27, as opposed to 3.00 for 
the nonreinforcement groups. The analysis of variance determined that 
reinforcement conditions differed significantly (F = 48.26, df = 1,20; 
p < .01). This clearly supports the hypothesis that reinforcement 
groups would make significantly more use of the affective verbalization 
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TABLE I 
MEAN REINFORCEABLE RESPONSES ACROSS SESSIONS FOR 
REINFORCEMENT AND NONREINFORCEMENT GROUPS 
Sessions 
n = 4 
Al A2 A3 
Reinforcement 1 4.50 5.00 6.50 
Groups 
2 6.00 6.25 6.75 
3 7.00 9.50 8.25 
Nonreinforce- 1 1.25 1.00 0.75 
ment Groups 2 2.00 2.50 0.75 
3 1.00 3.00 2.00 
TABLE II 
ANOVA SUMMARY TABLE FOR REINFORCEMENT VERSUS 
NONREINFORCEMENT GROUPS BY 
AFFECTIVE VERBALIZATIONS 
Source of 
Reinforcement 1 
Gl/yes-no 1 
Sessions 3 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 
Reinforcement by Sessions 3 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 3 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 3 
Subjects by Sessions 60 
**p < .• 01. 
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G2 
6.50 
4.75 
5.75 
1.25 
5.00 
2.75 
F 
48.26** 
1.04 
0.70 
0.03 
2.16 
0.38 
0.08 
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categories than would the nonreinforcement groups. It also lends further 
credibility to the technique as a powerful and reliable means for foster-
ing the learning of adaptive behavior. 
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Figure 1. Mean Reinforceable Responses for 
Reinforcement and Nonreinforce-
men t Groups 
The Gl/yes-no factor failed to achieve sta~~stical significance, 
suggesting that membership in the immediate generalization session had 
no detectable effect on response rates in the delayed generalization 
session. 
The sessions factor did not show a significant difference, indi-
cating that levels of responding in the acquisition sessions carried 
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over to the delayed generalization session. Thus, the hypothesis that 
generalization occurred is supported, but somewhat obscured by the fact 
that reinforcement by the fact that reinforcement by sessions interaction 
approached significance at the p < .10 level. To sort out the relation-
ship between reinforcement and nonreinforcement means across all eight 
sessions, a Newman-Keuls test was performed, according to Kirk (1968, p. 
91). Results of this analysis are displayed in Table III. 
The reinforcement groups at Al, A2, A3, and G2 are represented by 
RAl, RA2, RA3, and RG2; nonreinforcement groups are represented by NRAl, 
NRA2, NRA3, and NRG2. All reinforcement group means were significantly 
different from all nonreinforcement means, at the p < .01 level. These 
results lend further assurance that generalization did in fact occur for 
reinforcement groups in delayed generalization. 
Pre and Post Self-Disclosure 
Table IV contains the means for the Modified Jourard Self-Disclosure 
questionnaire for Pre-test and Post 2, reinforcement and nonreinforcement 
groups. The possible range of scores was zero to sixty. Reinforcement 
groups had a Pre-test mean score of 48.42, and nonreinforcement groups 
50.67. The Post 2 means were reinforcement 44.75 and nonreinforcement 
45.00. 
A three-way analysis of variance with repeated measures on the ses-
sions factor was used. However, none of the three factors reached 
statistical significance, failing to support any of the hypotheses con-
cerning the effects of the reinforcement technique on self-disclosure. 
NRA3 = 1/25 
NRA! = 1.50 
NRA2 :::; 2.16 
NRG2 = 3.00 
RG2 = 5.66 
RAl = 5.83 
RA2 = 6.92 
RA3 = 7.08 
**p < 
TABLE III 
NEWMAN~KEULS COMPARISON OF REINFORCEMENT AND 
NONREINFORCEMENT MEANS ACROSS ACQUISITION 
SESSIONS AND IN DELAYED GENERALIZATIONS 
NRA3 NRAl NRA2 NRG2 RG2 RAl 
. 01. 
.25 .91 1. 75 4.41** 4.58** 
.66 1.50 4.16** 4.33** 
.84 3.50** 3.67** 
2.66** 2.83** 
.13 
TABLE IV 
MEAN PRE-TEST AND POST 2 JOURARD 
SELF-DISCLOSURE SCORES 
Reinforcement 
Nonreinforcement 
Pre-Test 
48.42 
50.67 
Post 2 
44.75 
45.00 
RA2 
5.67** 
5.42** 
4.76** 
3.92** 
1.22 
.13 
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RA3 
5.83** 
5.58** 
4.92** 
4.08** 
1.42 
1.25 
.16 
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Note: Data from the two-way analyses of variance dealing with the 
randomly-selected "Gl/yes only" groups will not be presented for either 
the Jourard or Personal Orientation Inventory (POI). Selection of this 
analysis represents a methodological misjudgment, considering that: (1) 
there is a good deal of overlap between this analysis and the three-way 
analysis of variance. The data would provide little new information 
over and above that given by the reinforcement by sessions interaction 
on the three-way analysis of variance; and (2) perusal of the data from 
the analyses yielded almost no significant tests, underscoring the rela-
tive valuelessness of reporting it. 
Pre and Post Personal Orientation Inventory 
Table V presents the means for the 12 scales of the POI, Pre-test 
and Post 2, for reinforcement and nonreinforcement groups. Twelve three-
way analyses of variance, with repeated measures on the sessions factor, 
were used. The ANOVA summary tables appear as Appendix G. Significant 
results for each analysis and a brief statement of their bearing on the 
hypotheses are given below, with a summary to follow. 
1. Time Incompetence/Time Competence: The sessions factor reached 
statistical significance (F = 7.62, df = 1,20; p < .05), demonstrating 
an increase in "present orientation" for both reinforcement and nonrein-
forcement groups from Pre-test to Post 2. However, since the reinforce-
ment by sessions factor failed to reach significance, the sessions factor 
cannot be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis of a significant in-
crease for reinforcement groups only. \ . ~ 
2. Support Ratio: The sessions factor was significant (F = 15.32, 
df = 1,20; p < .01), suggesting an increase in orientation toward others 
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for both reinforcement and nonreinforcement groups. As above, this does 
not support the hypothesis that reinforcement groups would show an in-
crease over sessions. 
TABLE V 
MEAN PRE-TEST AND POST 2 POI SCORES 
·Scale No. Pre-Test Post 2 
and Symbol R NR R NR 
1 - TI/TC 14.58 16.50 16.83 17.25 
2 - O/I 76.92 82.25 82.67 86.75 
3 - SAV 18.67 19.50 19.75 20.50 
4 - Ex 18.83 19.00 22.17 22.08 
5 - Fr 13.58 16.08 14.75 15.50 
6 - s 11.50 12.25 12.08 11.58 
7 - Sr 11.25 11.25 12.42 12.25 
8 - Sa 13.67 14.92 15.67 17.00 
9 - Ne 9.08 11.58 10.92 12.25 
10 - Sy 6.17 6.75 7.08 7.58 
11 - A 13.92 16.58 16.00 17.41 
12 - c 16.92 16.92 17.92 18.75 
3. Self-Actualizing Value: Sessions factor was significant (F = 
5.69, df = 1,20; p < .05), and was interpreted as above. 
4. Existentiality: Sessions factor was significant (F = 26.26, 
df = 1,20; p < .01) suggesting an increase for both reinforcement and 
nonreinforcement groups, which is interpreted as above. 
5. Feeling Reactivity: The reinforcement by sessions factor 
approached significance at the p < .10 level (F ~ 3.57, df = 1,20). 
49 
Examining the means in Table V, this result provides some support for 
the hypothesis that reinforcement groups would show in increase in re-
sponsiveness to their own feelings and needs, while nonreinforcement sub-
jects would not. 
6. Spontaneity: The near significant reinforcement by sessions 
interaction (F = 3.07, df = 1,20; p < .10) and the direction of the means 
provide support for the hypothesis that reinforcement groups would in-
crease in spontaneity for Pre-test to Post 2, while nonreinforcement 
groups would not. 
7. Self-Regard: The sessions factor reached significance (F = 
7.51, df = 1,20; p < .05), affirming that reinforcement and nonreinforce-
ment groups both increased significantly in self-regard from Pre-test to 
Post 2, which fails to support the hypothesis that only reinforcement 
groups would show this effect. 
8. Self-Acceptance: Sessions factor (F = 4.66, df = 1,20; p < .05) 
and Gl/yes-no factor (F = 6.15, df = 1,20; p < .05) both reached signifi-
cance. The sessions factor is interpreted as before. The Gl/yes-no fac-
tor failed to support the hypothesis of highest response levels for 
R/Gl-yes. The cell means are: R/Gl-yes 15.17, R/Gl-no 14.17; and 
NR/Gl-yes 18.25, NR/Gl-no 13.67. As can be seen the Gl-yes groups out-
performed the Gl-no groups in both conditions. However, nonreinforcement 
groups in Gl-yes scored higher in self-acceptance than reinforcement 
groups, which fails to support the hypothesis concerning the superiority 
of the reinforcement groups. 
9. Nature of Man: In this analysis the r~~nforcement factor was 
significant (F = 5.33, df = 1,20; p < .05), but the nonreinforcement 
groups scored significantly higher than reinforcement groups. This does 
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not support the hypothesis that reinforcement subjects' view of man 
would be significantly more constructive than those in nonreinforcement 
groups. Sessions factor was also significant (F = 12.78, df = 1,20; 
p < .01), but is interpreted as failing to support the predicted pattern 
of change across Pre-test to Post 2. 
10. Synergy: Significant results were found on the sessions factor 
(F = 6. 70, df 
no factors (F 
1,20; p < .05) and near-significant results on the Gl/yes-
3.52, df = 1,20; p < .10). The sessions factor is inter-
preted as not supporting the hypothesis of change for reinforcement 
groups, while nonreinforcement groups would stay the same. As with the 
Self-Acceptance (No. 8) analysis, the Gl/yes-no factor does not support 
the hypothesis of Gl-yes in reinforcement groups as having the greatest 
mean score (R/Gl-yes 7.08, R/Gl-no 6.17; and NR/Gl-yes 7.50, NR/GlO-no 
6.83). 
11. Acceptance of Aggression: No significant factors were found. 
12. Capacity for Intimate Contact: The sessions factor was again 
the only one reaching significance (F = 4.60, df = 1,20; p < .05), but 
it does not support any of the stated hypotheses. 
In summary, the first hypothesis concerning higher scores on the 
POI scales for R subjects does not appear generally supported by the 
results of the 12 ANOVAs. Only one analysis yielded a significant rein-
forcement factor, (No. 9) Nature of Man. The second hypothesis, that 
reinforcement subjects would increase from Pre-test to Post 2 while non-
reinforcement subjects would not, was supported by significant reinforce-
ment by sessions factors on analyses of scales, . (No. 5) Feeling 
Reactivity and (No. 6) Spontaneity. The third hypothesis, that R/Gl-yes 
subjects would score higher than the other three Gl/yes-no groups, was 
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supported by significant results and means in the required relationship 
on the analysis of (No. 10) Synergy only. 
The persistence of a significant sessions factor, without the rein-
forcement by sessions interaction, seems to indicate an uncontrolled but 
fairly consistent variable operating among reinforcement and nonrein-
forcement groups. A discussion of this phenomenon will be offered in the 
next section. 
Group Perceptions Data 
Means for the eight measures of the Group Perceptions Test taken 
following Al, A3 and G2 are presented for reinforcement and nonreinforce-
ment groups in Table VI. The eight ANOVA sununary tables appear as 
Appendix H. Significant results for each measure, with a statement of 
their bearing on specific hypotheses, are listed below. Also, Newman-
Keuls tests were performed for those measures with significant reinforce-
ment by sessions effects, as indicated in Table VI. Results from these 
appear as Appendix I. 
1. Congruency: The only factor reaching significance on this mea-
sure was reinforcement by seniors (F = 3.40, df = 2,40; p < .05). Look-
ing at Table VI it can be seen that reinforcement groups were 
significantly more congruent after Al, but had become significantly less 
so after session A3. However, by G2 the reinforcement groups were again 
more congruent than nonreinforcement groups. 
2. Mutuality: Again the reinforcement by sessions factor reached 
significance (F = 5.45, df = 2,40; p < .05). Th.~ pattern of means is 
almost identical: reinforcement groups were significantly more mutual 
after session Al, significantly less so after A3, and not significantly 
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different after G2. From the two measures, congruency and mutuality, 
examined thus far, it appears that reinforcement had an unexpected effect 
on social perceptions. 
TABLE VI 
MEAN GROUP PERCEPTIONS SCORES ACROSS SESSIONS 
Measure Al A3 G2 
Congruency* N~ 19.75a 32.08c 20.83a 31. 25c 21. 92a,b 24.67b 
Mutuality* N~ 32.0Ba 46.17c 31. 75a 53.83d 35.17b 30.17a 
Accuracy N~ 20.75 27.25 20.75 30.33 28.08 19.33 
R1 24.83b 24.17b 22.67b Empathy* N~ 32.42c 30.75c 15.83a 
Interpersonal N~ 22.50 28.08 27.25 Openness 29.83 29.25 18.82 
Personal* N~ 24.83b 24.33b 31. OOc Openness 32.17c 30.42c 15.83a 
Felt N~ 14.25 13.08 13.92 Openness 11.67 6.05 11.00 
Realism* N~ 26.50b 29.SOb 21.33a 32.25c 29.42b 18. l7a 
*Newman Keuls tests for simple effects, were computed for 
starred items. Means with different superscripts were signi-
ficantly different from each other at the p < .05 level. 
Those with the same superscript were not significantly differ-
ent. 
53 
3. Although none of the factors was significant in this analysis, 
just looking at the means suggests that at least the direction of the 
trends was similar to the above two. 
4. Empathy: This analysis yielded a significant sessions factor 
(F = 3.65, df = 2,40; p < .05) and a reinforcement by sessions factor 
which approaches significance at the p < .10 level (F = 2.26, df = 2,40). 
Examination of the means shows reinforcement groups significantly more 
empathic than nonreinforcement groups after A3, yet significantly less so 
after delayed generalization. Nonreinforcement groups showed precisely 
the pattern predicted for reinforcement groups. 
5. Interpersonal Openness: None of the factors has achieved sta-
tistical significance. Reinforcement groups appear to become less open 
across sessions, while nonreinforcement groups changed very little across 
acquisition sessions, but became more open after delayed generalization. 
6. Personal Openness: The reinforcement by sessions factor 
approached significance at the p < .10 level (F = 2.83, df = 2,40). The 
means reveal that the exact opposite of the predicted effects occurred. 
Reinforcement groups did not vary significantly from Al to A3, but then 
became significantly less open after session G2. Nonreinforcement groups 
did not change significantly across acquisition sessions either, but be-
came much more open after delayed generalization. 
7. Felt Openness: This analysis failed to reach statistical signi-
ficance. Reinforcement groups appear to have remained relatively un-
changed across all sessions. Nonreinforcement groups appear to have 
felt themselves slightly more open than reinforcement groups, particular-
ly after session A3. 
Ii 
I 
I 
I 
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8. Realism: The sessions factor was significant at the p < .05 
level (F = 3.92, df = 2,40). The Newman-Keuls test revealed that both 
reinforcement and nonreinforcement groups became more realistic after 
delayed generalization, but the difference between these two groups did 
not reach statistical significance as a result of delayed generalization. 
Briefly, the hypothesis that reinforcement groups would show more 
of the attributes derived from the Group Perceptions Test was not gener-
ally supported by the data. It in fact appears that the opposite trend 
occurred: the reinforcement groups showed significantly more Congruency, 
Mutuality, Accuracy, Personal Openness, and Realism as a result of the 
first acquisition session, but generally tended to show less of these 
attributes after A3. After the delayed generalization session the non-
reinforcement groups showed significantly more on three measures. The 
other two found reinforcement groups showing more congruency after 
delayed generalization; and no significant difference between the two on 
Mutuality after delayed generalization. The Gl/yes-no factor failed to 
achieve significance on any of the eight analyses. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
Results will be discussed in the order of their presentation in 
the last section. The first major purpose was a replication of the rein-
forcement effect demonstrated in previous studies. This was accomplished 
with the data clearly showing that reinforcement groups were superior in 
their use of the categories. The two statistical tests provide high 
levels of assurance that the groups were significantly different, parti-
cularly since the F-test was highly significant and the Neuman-Keuls 
showed that each of the reinforcement means was different from every non-
reinforcement mean. 
As in previous research, then, the operant technique is supported 
as an effective and reliable means of modifying verbal behavior. What 
distinguishes the results of the present study is that this effect was 
achieved with a larger number of subjects than in any of the previous 
studies. Heretofore, the low numbers typical of exploratory research 
have allowed the possibility of idiosyncratic effects. In the present 
study the total number of subjects was precisely three times that in 
the first "extinction and generalization" study (Fromme, Stommel and 
Duvall, 1976), yet the response levels of the two are very close. The 
net result is increased confidence in asserting,, the reliability of the 
technique. 
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Next it was hypothesized that reinforcement groups would show a 
significant increase in total affective verbalizations across sessions, 
while nonreinforcement groups would not. This prediction, however, was 
not supported by the data. Looking at the ~eans, reinforcement groups 
began at a high response total and increased only slightly across 
acquisition sessions, dropping off in delayed generalization. Nonrein-
forcement groups never really showed any gain, until one anomalous group 
raised the delayed session mean. So there was a slight convergence in 
delayed generalization due at least in part to this unusually active 
nonreinforcement group. 
Although the absence of a sessions effect supports the next hypo-
thesis, that long-term generalization effects would occur, the clarity 
of the effect is somewhat obscured by the tendency of reinforcement and 
nonreinforcement means to converge in delayed generalization. Also, the 
reinforcement by sessions interaction at least approached significance 
at the p < .10 level. Therefore, the Neuman-Keuls provided a means of 
further determining whether generalization had really occurred. Results 
showed no overlap between reinforcement and nonreinforcement session 
means. This demonstration of a 45-day delay is therefore the first long-
term generalization effect using this technique, and from the data 
appears a very convincing one. 
The test for the effects of participation in an additional general-
ization session on response levels in delayed generalization failed to 
reach significance. Apparently immediate generalization came too soon 
after the last acquisition to create an effect ~hat was durable over 45 
days. It could be that placement of immediate generalization sessions 
midway between the last acquisition and delayed generalization might 
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have had a measurable effect. As it was, whether or not delayed 
generalization was the first or second generalization session for a group 
had no detectable impact. 
Failure of the Modified Jourard data to reflect a significant differ-
ence in willingness to self-disclose between reinforcement and nonrein-
forcement groups is both disappointing and puzzling, more so because the 
latter groups were actually more willing than reinforcement groups to 
self-disclose in both the first acquisition and delayed generalization. 
Also, both reinforcement and nonreinforcement groups showed a decline, 
although not a significant one, in their willingness to reveal them-
selves. As far as the reinforcement groups are concerned, the most 
salient question is what led these subjects to be less open after the 
45-day delay? This finding is in direct contrast with Smallwood's 
(1975) results showing an impact on subjects' reported willingness to 
disclose themselves. 
Several explanations for this phenomenon are present. One that 
must be seriously considered is the possibility of "ceiling effects" 
that was due to a subject pool with high pre-treatment levels of self-
disclosure. Comparing these college students with Smallwood's (1975) 
psychiatric subjects tends to lend credence to this suggestion. His 
groups were roughly 30% lower in initial self-disclosure scores (experi-
mental 38.50, control 33.92), but managed to show a significant increase 
across sessions. Jourard's (1964) norm group levels, when adjusted for 
the modification, are 40% to 50% lower than groups in this study (27.87 
average) for groups heterogeneous as to sex and .r<l;ce, when the target 
was described as a friend. These findings provide support for the 
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notion that the lack of a significant effect was at least in part due 
to ceiling effects. 
The decrease across testings might also be attributed to another 
factor: that both reinforcement and nonreinforcement subjects reacted 
to initial high self-disclosure by conscious self-restraint at later 
testings. They could have perceived themselves as "over-disclosing" to 
a group of strangers, with the result that they decided to be more con-
servative. This process would have contributed to the pattern of scores 
obtained. 
There is also a question of whether the types of self-disclosure 
demanded by the operant procedure ("here and now") conflicted with the 
more historical questions asked on the questionnaire. The two tasks 
seem to demand two different sorts of self-disclosure, which could cer-
tainly have also been a factor in reports of self-disclosure decreasing 
at Post 2. 
A final conjecture is that time simply had a greater effect on the 
scores than the reinforcement technique. The period of time set to test 
transfer of effects may have been too ambitious. But there were also 
two differences in the use of the questionnaire between the present study 
and Smallwood (1975); he administered it just after the group session, 
while here it was just prior to the sessions and after a lapse of 45 
days. Whatever tendency to self-disclose was engendered by the rein-
forcement technique was seemingly diluted by the long delay. Then too, 
administering the questionnaires just following the group sessions might 
have made a significant difference, since this ~9uld have more directly 
reflected what took place in the session. It may also be argued, 
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however, that such a procedure would primarily record the effects of 
specific sessions rather than a general willingness to self-disclosure. 
The effects of splitting up subjects into groups of Gl-yes and 
Gl-no were not significant. There were no detectable differences result-
ing from having been administered the Modified Jourard on two versus 
three occasions. 
Another possible source of nuisance variables, more a matter of 
timing than just lapse of time, should be considered. At the first 
administration of the questionnaire, subjects were just entering a new 
situation, for many the first psychological research in which they had 
participated. By the time of the second or third testing, the setting 
and the task were no longer novel. As it happened, the delayed general-
ization sessions fell within two weeks of finals, a period that finds 
most college students less than euphoric. The possibility of anxiety 
and resentment of being away from studies was reflected in the tone and 
content of some conversations monitored during delayed generalization 
sessions. 
Analysis of the Personal Orientation Inventory data failed to pro-
vide general support for the hypothesized effects of the reinforcement 
procedure on its 12 scales. Except for the "Nature of Man," none of the 
scales showed a significant reinforcement effect. It appears that rein-
forcement subjects were not changing those self-perceptions measured by 
the POI as a result of using the categories. Of course, "self-
actualizing" attributes could not reasonably be viewed as being as re-
sponsive as the reinforcement categories, and it seems that such a 
I 
short-term technique ultimately had little effect on these more permanent 
personality characteristics. 
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One problem in finding a differential reinforcement versus nonrein-
forcement effect is that the latter were actually more self-actualizing 
on the Pre-test measure. This initial difference would complicate get-
ting a reinforcement effect, since it would have to be overcome during 
training. 
The sessions factor was significant on eight of the twelve analy-
ses, indicating that both reinforcement and nonreinforcement groups had 
increased in self-actualization attributes from Pre-test to Post 2. 
Without the reinforcement by sessions factor reaching significance and 
the means in the right relationship, however, this does not support any 
of the hypotheses. Yet the effect appeared so consistently that some 
powerful influence on subject attitude clearly seems to have been 
operating. 
A possible explanation for the unexpected increases in POI scores 
for delayed generalization comes from the literature on the use of 
college students as subjects. First is a survey by Rosenthal and Rosnow 
(1969), who found one consistent characteristic of volunteer subjects, 
vis-~-vis other college s~udents, to be a high need for social approval. 
That a need for approval from the experimenter may be an important factor 
has been pointed out by Orne (1962), who observes that volunteer students 
may wish to perform as a means of confirming themselves to be "good" sub-
jects. According to.him, they often feel that they "have a very real 
stake in the successful outcome of the experiment." 
In the present study subjects were expressly informed of the purpose 
of the experiment, which was to get to know each. other on a personal 
basis through the use of the categories. Those subjects in the nonrein-
forcement conditions, however, were not successful in using the 
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categories. That they were aware of their failure was brought to the 
experimenter's attention repeatedly by statements such as "We didn't do 
too well, did we?" According to the literature cited above, one way 
they could reduce the dissonant cognitions "I want to be a good subject" 
and "I didn't do well" is to attempt to subsequently perform according 
to what he perceives as the experimenter's expectations; in this case, 
to do better on another task involved in the experiment. In the case of 
the POI, this could require answering in a "healthy" or "positive" 
direction on Post 2. That this might be possible is indicated by the 
results {F = 26.26) of the sessions factor on #4, Existentiality. An 
effect this large tends to suggest that the POI could be somewhat trans-
parent, so that a subject could "fake good" if motivated to do so. 
The analysis of two scales produced significant reinforcement by 
sessions factors: #5 Feeling Reactivity and #6 Spontaneity. At the 
p < .10 level, however, these must be regarded rather tentatively. 
Taken together they do suggest that subjects became more sensitized to 
feelings and the need to express them. The Gl/yes-no factor achieved 
significance on only one scale, #9 Synergy. This does not provide sup-
port for the effects of being in immediate generalization, or having 
been administered Post 1, on scores at Post 2. 
Data from the eight analyses of measures derived from the Group 
Perceptions Test showed some unexpected patterns. The most consistent 
was one in which the reinforcement groups had superior scores (the 
smaller) after the first acquisition sessions. Clearly the initial 
effect of the reinforcement technique on social,perceptions was to 
sharpen them. The remainder of the pattern for reinforcement groups, 
however, is that they declined on almost every measure across acquisi-
tion and then slightly improved in delayed generalization. 
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Nonreinforcement groups, on the other hand, displayed exactly the 
pattern predicted for the reinforcement groups, with a relatively poor 
score following the first session, and marked improvement in the third 
acquisition and in delayed generalization. One general explanation for 
this finding is that nonreinforcement groups showed this session effect 
simply because of the opportunity to interact in a permissive atmosphere. 
Even without the reinforcement technique, this type of group session 
represents a unique opportunity for college students to engage their 
peers on an unusually personal level. 
Failure of the reinforcement groups to improve over acquisition 
sessions is puzzling, and is most likely due to a complex of factors. 
One of these could be qualitative variations in group interaction. It 
was the subjective impression of the experimenter, taken from a log of 
each session, that reinforcement and nonreinforcement groups differed 
markedly in how they interacted with each other. Nonreinforcement 
groups tended to stay with a very superficial "pastime" style, in spite 
of specific instructions to avoid this. The reinforcement groups, who 
used the categories more successfully, also followed more closely the 
request for open and honest feedback. At times this predictably led to 
discord; but this could be viewed as more "realistic" interaction. 
Since the Group Perceptions Test is exploratory, the exact potential for 
these group attributes to affect scores is unknown. However, the possi-
bility of "group denial" in nonreinforcement groups, and "realistic dis-
cord" in reinforcement groups having had a differential effect must be 
acknowledged. 
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Summary 
The first two major purposes of this study were accomplished in a 
very clear and conclusive fashion. These results provide solid support 
for this operant technique as a powerful and reliable modifier of af fec-
ti ve verbalizations. Furthermore, the effects of training were shown to 
meet two very important outcome criteria necessary for any method for 
therapeutic behavior change: durability and flexibility. The level of 
responding learned during initial sessions persisted over a 45-day period, 
and they were shown to have transferred to a new group situation. The 
credibility of these results is enhanced by the large number of subjects 
in the study. 
The use of the three instruments in the hope of gaining other per-
spectives on the impact of the method was much less successful. Several 
hypotheses have been offered as to the lack of significant findings, but 
ultimately their absence can probably be attributed to the unsuitability 
of the instruments for such a short-term method, and the lapse of time 
and events over one and one-half months. Nonetheless, the technique has 
been shown to produce positive changes in verbal behavior, and a search 
for additional means of cross-validation should continue. 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ball, R. s. Reinforcement conditioning of verbal behavior by verbal and 
nonverbal stimuli in a situation resembling a clinical interview. 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1952.) 
Bednar, R. L., & Lawlis, F. G. Empirical research in group psycho-
therapy. In A. E. Bergin ands. L. Garfield (Eds.), Handbook of 
Psychotherapy and Behavior Change. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1971. 
Bergin, A. E. Evaluation of therapeutic outcomes. In A. E. Bergin and 
s. L. Garfield (Eds.), Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior 
Change. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1971. 
Borgatta, E. F. "The use of psychodrama, sociodrama and related tech-
niques in social psychological research. Sociometry, 1954, 13, 
244-258. 
Culbert, S. A., Clark, J. V., & Bobele, H.K. Measures of changes toward 
self-actualization in two sensitivity training groups. Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, 1968, 15, 53-57. 
Dickens, C. , & Fordham, M. 
in quasi-therapeutic 
1967, 14, 145~152. 
Effects of reinforcement of self-references 
interviews. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 
Ekman, P. A methodological discussion of nonverbal behavior. Journal 
of Psychology, 1957, 43, 141-149. 
Eysenck, H.J. (Ed.). Behavior Therapy and the Neuroses. New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1952. 
Foulds, M. L. Positive mental health and facilitative genuineness dur-
ing counseling. Personnel and Guidance Journal, 1969, 47, 762-766 
(a) • 
Foulds, M. L. Self-actualization and level of counselor interpersonal 
functioning. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 1969, ~, 87-92 (b). 
Foulds, M. L. Self-actualization and the communication of facilitation 
conditions during counseling. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 
1969, 16, 132-136 (c). 
Fox, J. On the clinical use of the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI). 
Unpublished manuscript, 1965. 
64 
65 
Fox, J., Knapp, R.R., & Michael, W. B .. Assessment of self-actualization 
of psychiatric patients: Validity of the Personal Orientation Inven-
tory. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 1968, 28, 565-569. 
Fromm, E. Escape From Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
1941. 
Fromme, D. K. The Group Perceptions Test. Unpublished manuscript, 
Oklahoma State University, 1976. 
Fromme, D. K., & Close, S .. R. Group compatibility and the modification 
of affective verbalizations. Unpublished manuscript, Oklahoma 
State University, 1975. 
Fromme, D. K., Stommel, J., & Duvall, R. Group modification of affective 
verbalizations: Resistance to extinction and generalization 
effects. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1976, 
_!2, 395-402. 
Fromme, D. K., Whisenant, W., Susky, H., & Tedesco, J. Group modifica-
tion of affective verbalizations. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 1974, 42, 866-871. 
Graff, R. W., & Bradshaw, H. E. Relationship of a measure of self-
actualization to dormitory assistant effectiveness. Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, 1970, 17, 502-505. 
Graff, R. W., Bradshaw, 
A validity check. 
1970, lQ_, 429-432. 
H. E., Danish, S. J., & Austin, B. A. The POI: 
Educational and Psychological Measurements, 
Greenspoon, J. The effect of two nonverbal stimuli on the frequency of 
members of two verbal response classes. American Psychologist, 
1954, 2_, 384 (Abstract) . 
Greenspoon, J. The reinforcing effect of two spoken sounds on the fre-
quency of two responses. American Journal of Psychology, 1955, 
68, 409-416. 
Greenspoon, J. Verbal conditioning. In A. V. Bachrach (Ed.) Experi-
mental Foundations of Clinical Psychology. New York: Basic Books, 
1962. 
Guinan, J. F., & Foulds, M. L. Marathon group: Facilitator of personal 
growth? Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1970, 17, 145-149. 
Gutierrez, M., & Eisenman, R. Verbal· conditioning of neurotic and psy-
chopathic delinquents using verbal and nonverbal reinforcers. 
Psychological Reports, 1971, 29, 7-10. 
Heckmat, H. Reinforcing value of interpretations and reflections in a 
quasi-therapeutic interview. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1971, 
77 (1)' 25-31. 
66 
Heckmat, H., & Theiss, M. Self-actualization and modification of affec-
tive self-disclosures during a quasi-therapy interview. Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, 1971, 18, 101-105. 
Hersen, M. Awareness in verbal operant conditioning: Some comments. 
Journal of General Psychology, 1968, 78, 287-296. 
Himmelstein, P., & Kimbrough, W.W. 
and a measure of self-disclosure 
logical Reports, 1966, 19, 166. 
Relationship of the MMPI K-scale 
in a normal population. Psycho-
Hoffnung, R. J. Conditioning and transfer of affective self-references 
in a role-played counseling interview. Dissertation Abstracts, 
1968, 28 (8-B) I 3472. 
Holz, W. C., & Azrin, N. H. Conditioning human behavior. In W. K. 
Honig (Ed.), Operant Behavior. New York: Appleton, 1966. 
Hood, W. D. Counselor-client similarity of self-actualization level 
and its relationship to counseling outcome. (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Ball State University, 1968.) 
Humphreys,· L. G. 
a situation 
Psychology, 
Acquisition and extinction of verbal expectations in 
analogous to conditioning. Journal of Experimental 
1939, ~' 294-301. 
Hurley, J. R., & Hurley, S. J. Toward authenticity in measuring self-
disclosure. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1969, 16 (3), 271-
274. 
Ince, L. P. Effects of fixed-interval reinforcement on the frequency 
of a verbal response class in a quasi-counseling situation. 
Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1968, 15, 140-146. 
Ince, L. P. Fixed-ratio reinforcement in verbal conditioning. Psycho-
nomic Science, 1970, 18 (6), 327-329. 
Jourard, S. Personal Adjustment: An Approach Through the Study of a 
Healthy Personality. New York: McMillan, 1961. 
Jourard, s. Self-Disclosure: An Experimental Analysis of the Trans-
parent Self. New York:. Wiley, 1971. 
Jourard, s., & Lasakow, P. Some factors in self-disclosure. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1958, 56, 91-98. 
Kanfer, F. H. Verbal conditioning: A review of its current status. In 
T. R. Dixon and T. L. Horton (Eds.), Verbal Behavior and General 
Behavior Theory. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 
I 
Kanfer, F. H., & Phillips, J. S. Learning Foundations of Behavior 
Therapy. New York: John Wiley, 1970. 
67 
Kirk, R. E. Experimental Design: Procedure for the Behavioral Sciences. 
Belmont: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1968. 
Krasner, L. Studies of the conditioning of verbal behavior. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 1958, 55, 148-170. 
Krasner, L. The therapist as a social reinforcement machine. In H. H. 
Strupp & L. Luborsky (Eds.), Research in Psychotherapy, Vol. 2. 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1962 • 
. Krasner, L. Verbal conditioning and psychotherapy. In S. Krasner & 
L. Ullman (Eds.), Research in Behavior Modification. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965. 
Krueger, D. E. Operant group therapy with delinquent boys using thera-
pist's vs. peer's reinforcement. Dissertation Abstracts Interna-
tional, 1971, May, l!. (11-B), 6877-6878, 63. 
Laing, R. D., Phillipson, H., & Lee, A. R. Interpersonal Perception. 
New York: Springer, 1966. 
Lanyon, R. I. Verbal conditioning: Transfer of training in a therapy-
like situation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1967, 72, 30-34. 
Lemay, M. L., & Damm, V. J. The Personal Orientation Inventory as a 
measure of the self-actualization of underachievers. Measurement 
and Evaluation in Guidance, 1968, .!_, 110-114. 
Levine, F. M., & Fasnacht, G. Token rewards may lead to token learning. 
American Psychologist, 1974, 29, 816-820. 
Liberman, R. P. Behavioral approach to group dynamics. Behavior 
Therapy, 1970, 1, 141-175 & 312-327. 
Liberman, R. P. Behavioral group therapy: A controlled clinical study. 
British Journal of Psychiatry, November, 1971, 119 (552), 535-544. 
Mann, J. W. The effects of reflection and race on verbal conditioning 
of affective self-disclosure in black and white males. (Unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Auburn University, 1972.) 
Maslow, A. H. The Further Reaches of Human Nature. New York: Viking 
Press, 1971. 
Merbaum, M., & Lukens, H. C. Effects of instructions, elicitations and 
reinforcements in the manipulation of affective verbal behavior. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1965, 70, 180-187. 
McClain, E. W. Further validation of the Personal Orientation Inven-
tory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1970, ~. 
20-22. 
McNair, D. M. Reinforcement of verbal behavior. Journal of E~peri­
mental Psychology, 1957, ~. 40-46. 
68 
Mock, J. F. The influence of verbal and behavioral cues of a listener 
on the verbal productions of a speaker. (Unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, University of Kentucky, 1957.) 
Moos, R. H. The retention and generalization of operant conditioning 
effects in an interview situation. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 1963, 66 (1), 52-58. 
Myrick, R. D. Effects of a model on verbal behavior in counseling. 
Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1969, 16 (3), 185-190. 
Nuthemann, A. M. Conditioning of a response class on a personality test. 
Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 1957, 54, 19-23. 
Olson, G. K. The effects of interviewer self-disclosing and reinforcing 
behavior on subject self-disclosure. (Unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Arizona, 1972.) 
Orne, M. T. On the social psychology of the psychological experiment. 
American Psychologist, 1962, 17, 776-783. 
Panyard, C. Self-disclosure between friends: A validity study. Journal 
of Counseling Psychology, 1973, 20, 66-68. 
Pearson, 0. Effects of group guidance on college adjustment. (Unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1966.) 
Powell, W. J. Differential effectiveness of interviewer interventions 
in an experimental interview. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 1968, ~, 210-215. 
Phelan, J. G., Tang, T., & Heckmat, H. Some effects of various schedules 
of verbal reinforcement on self-references responses. Journal of 
Psychology, 1967, 67, 17-24. 
Razran, G. Stimulus generalization of conditioned responses. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 1949, 46, 337-365. 
Resnick, J. L. Some effects of self-disclosure among college women. 
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 1970, 10, 84-93. 
Rogers, J. M. Operant conditioning in a quasi-therapy setting. Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 60 (2), 247-252. 
Rosenthal, R., & Rosnou, R. Artifact in Behavioral Research. New York: 
Academic Press, 1969. 
Salzberg, H. C. Effects of silence and redirection of verbal responses 
in group psychotherapy. Psychological Reports, 1962, 11, 455-461. 
Salzinger, K. Experimental manipulation of verbal behavior: A review. 
Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1959, 61, 65-94. 
Sarason, I. G. Interrelations among individual difference variable, 
behavior in psychotherapy and verbal conditioning. Paper read at 
Western Psychological Association, Eugene, Oregon, 1957. 
69 
Shostrum, E. L. A test for the measurement of self-actualization. Edu-
cational and Psychological Measurement, 1965, 24, 207-218. 
Skinner, B. F. The Behavior of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis. 
New York: Appleton, 1938. 
Smallwood, R. E. Group modification of affective and self-disclosing 
verbalizations in a psychiatric population. (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1975.) 
Spielberger, C. D., & DeNike, C. D. Operant conditioning of plural 
nouns: A failure to replicate the Gree~spoon effect. Psycho-
logical Reports, 1962, 11, 355-366. 
Sullivan, H. S. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1953. 
Taffel, C. Anxiety and the conditioning of verbal behavior. Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1955, 51, 496-501. 
Taguiri, R. Relational analysis: An extension of sociometric method 
with emphasis on social perception. Sociometry, 1952, 15, 91-104. 
Truax, C. B., & Carkhuff, R. R. Toward Effective Counseling and Psycho-
therapy. Chicago: Aldini Publishing Co., 1967. 
Ullman, L., Krasner, L., & Collins, B. Modification 
verbal conditioning: Effects in group therapy. 
and Social Psychology, 1961, 62, 128-132. 
of behavior through 
Journal of Abnormal 
Vondracek, F. The manipulation of self-disclosure in an experimental 
interview situation. Dissertation Abstracts International, 1969, 
30 (4-A), 1643. 
Williams, J. H. Conditioning of verbalizations: A review. Psycho-
_!93ical Bulletin, 1966, 62, 383-393. 
Williams, R. I., & Blanton, R. L. Verbal conditioning in a psycho-
therapy situation. Behavior Research and Therapy, 1968, .§_, 97-103. 
Wolf, A. Group psychotherapy with adults: The alternate meeting. 
Paper read at American Personnel and Guidance Association meeting, 
New York, 1961. 
Yalom, I. D. The Theory and Practice of Group Psychotherapy. New York: 
Basic Books, 1970. 
APPENDIX A 
MODIFIED JOURARD SELF-DISCLOSURE QUESTIONNAIRE 
70 
71 
You can see that the answer sheet you have been given has four dif-
ferent possible answers: A, B, C, or D. You are to read each item in 
the booklet and choose the answer that most nearly applies to you for 
that item. That is, use the answer sheet to indicate how much you would 
be willing to disclose to a group composed of yourself and three other 
college students with whom you are unacquainted, whose stated purpose is 
to get to know each other on a personal basis. 
The four possible answers are: 
A--Would tell these people nothing about this aspect of me. 
B--Would talk in general terms about this item. 
C--Would talk in full and complete detail about this item. 
D--would lie or misrepresent myself to these people about 
this particular item. 
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1. What I think and feel about religion; my personal religious views. 
2. My views on the present government--the president, government, 
policies, etc. 
3. My personal views on sexual morality--how I feel that I and others 
ought to behave in sexual matters. 
4. The things that I regard as desirable for a man to be--what I look 
for in a man. 
5. My favorite reading matter. 
6. The style of house, and the kinds of furnishings that I like best. 
7. The kind of party or social gathering that I like best, and the 
kind that would bore me, or that I would not enjoy. 
8. My favorite ways of spending spare time, e.g., hunting, reading, 
cards, sports events, parties, dancing, etc. 
9. What I would appreciate most for a present. 
10. What I find to be the worst pressures and strains in my work. 
11. What I feel are my shortcomings and handicaps that prevent me from 
getting further ahead in my work. 
12. What I feel are my special strong points and qualifications for my 
work. 
13. My ambitions and goals in my work. 
14. How I feel about the choice of career that I have made--whether or 
not I am satisfied with it. 
15. Whether or not I owe money; if so, how much. 
16. The aspects of my personality that I dislike, worry about, that I 
regard as a handicap to me. 
17. What feelings, if any, that I have trouble expressing or controlling. 
18. The facts of my present sex life--including kpowledge of how I get 
sexual gratification; any problems that I might have; with whom I 
have relations, if anybody. · 
19. Whether or not I feel that I am attractive to the opposite sex; my 
problems, if any, about getting favorable ~ttention from the oppo-
site sex. 
20. Things in the past or present that I feel ashamed and guilty about. 
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21. The kinds of things that make me just furious. 
22. What it takes to get me feeling really depressed or blue. 
23. What it takes to get me really worried, anxious, and afraid. 
24. What it takes to hurt my feelings deeply. 
25. The kinds of things that make me especially proud of myself, elated, 
full of self-esteem or self-respect. 
26. My feelings about the appearance of my face--things I do not like, 
and things that I might like about my face and head--eyes, nose, 
hair, teeth, etc. 
27. How I wish I looked: my ideals for overall appearance. 
28. Whether or not I now have any health problems--e.g., trouble with 
sleep, digestion, female complaints, heart condition, allergies, 
headaches, piles, etc. 
29. Whether or not I have any long-range worries or concerns about my 
health, e.g., cancer, ulcers, heart trouble. 
30. My feelings about my adequacy in sexual behavior--whether or not I 
feel able to perform adequately in sex relationships. 
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PERSONAL ORIENTATION INVENTORY 
EVERETT L. SHOSTROM, Ph.D. 
DIRECTIONS 
This inventory consists of pairs of numbcn'd statements. He:1d each 
sLlLernenl and decide which of the two paired sl:tternents most consistently 
:ippl1cs to you. 
You are to mark your answers on the answc,r sheet you have. Look at the 
example of the answer sheet shown at the rig:ht. lJ 
the first statement of the pair is TRUE or MOSTLY 
Tl\l1E as applied to you, blacken between the lines 
in tlw c:olumn headed "a". (See Example Item 1 :1l 
ri~hl.) lfthc second statement of the pair is TRUE 
01· l\IOSTL\' THl'E as applied lo you, blacken be-
twe<'ll thl' lines in the column he:ided "b". (SPe 
Exam pl<• ll<·rn ~ at ri:.',hl.) 1f neither st:itement :ip-
plie~ to you, ~r if they rt'f(•r to sornetl1ing you don 1t 
know about. n1;1ke no answer on the answer shct>t. 
Section of Answer 
Column Correctly 
Morke-d 
a b 
I .. I 
a b 
2. .. I 
lkn1l'rnl.iPr to ~1ve YOUH OWl\ opinion of yourself :ind do not leave any blank 
:--;pat"l"'S if you can avoid it. 
In marking your answers on the ans\\·cr sheet. be sure lh:it the number 
of the sl:11P nwnl agrPl'S with the number on lhl' :insll'L•r slwct. lllakcyotu- marks 
hl'aYy and black. Er:1sl' con1pletely any answer you \\'ish to ch;tnge. Do not n1nke 
any marks in this booklet. 
Henwn1bcr, try to m~tkc ~ ans\V(T to every slatt'ment. 
Before you liq~in the in\·cntory. be sure you put _your n~me. your sex. 
your age. and th,• oth<·r infon11ation c:illed for rn the space pro1·iclcd on the ans'""r 
sheet. 
~OW OPE'.'\ TllE BOOKLET AND START WITH QLTESTION l. 
©Copyright l ~J(i:! b~· L\·('rct1 L. Shn.strl1m 
©c,_1 11~Ti~h; Eli";;~ l'Y Educatiun;1J e:..: Industrial Testi:1~ SLT\·ic..:e 
EDUCATIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL TESTING SERVICE \\ SAN OiEGO. CALIFC'RN:.r.. 921C7 
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1. a. I am bound by the principle of fairness. 
b. I nm not absolutely bound by the principle of 
fairness. 
2. a. When a friend does me a favor, I feel that I 
must return it. 
b. When a friend does me a favor, I do not feel 
that I must return it. 
3. a. I feel I must always tell the truth. 
b. I do not always tell the truth. 
4. a. No matter how hard I try, my feelings are 
often hurt. 
b. If I manage the situation right, I can avoid 
being hurt. 
5. a. I foel that I must stri\·e for perfection in 
<'verything that I undertake. 
b. I do not ft•el that I must strh·c for perfection 
in c•n•rything that I undertake. 
6. a. l oft<·n make my decisions spontaneously. 
b. l seldom make my decisions spontaneously. 
7. a. lam afraid to be myself. 
l>. I am not afraid to be myself. 
!J. a. I feel obligated when a stranger docs me a 
favor. 
b. l do not fed obligated when a stranger does 
me a favor. 
9. a. I feel that J have :i right to expect others to 
do what I want of them. 
b. I do not fp<•l that! have a right to expect others 
to do what I want of them. 
10. a. I Jin· by \'alul·s which arc rn agreement with 
ollwrs. 
h. I li\·1· hy \·alul•s which nn· primarily based on 
n1y own fp(·lings. 
l l. a. I :im eonePrnC"d with sdf-impro\'C'mcnt at all 
1 i nn·s. 
h. I a111 not <.0oncerned with :;elf-improvemc·nt at 
all tirrn:s. 
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12. a. I feel [.,'llilly when I am seliish. 
b. I don't feel guilty wh011 Jam selfisii. 
13. a. I ha\·e no objection to getting angry. 
b. AngC'r is something I try to amid. 
14. a. For me, anything is possible if I believe in 
myself. 
b. I ha\·e a lot of natural limitations even though 
I belie\·e in myself. 
15. a. I put others' interests before my own. 
b. do not put others' interests before my ow11. 
16. a. sometimes feel embarrassed by 
compliments. 
b. I am not embarrassed by compliments. 
17. a. I be Ii eve it is important to accept others as 
they are. 
b. I belieYe it i.s important to understand why 
others arc as they arc. 
18. a. lean put off until tomorrow what I ought to do 
today. 
b. I don't put off until tomorrow what I ought to 
do today. 
19. a. I can gi\·e without requiring the other person 
to appreciate what J give. 
b. I ha\·e a right to expect the other person to 
appreciate what I give. 
20. a. My moral \·alucs are dictated by suciety. 
b. My moral values are self-determined. 
21. a. I do what others expect of me. 
b. Ifee l free to not do what others expect of me. 
22. a. I accept my weaknesses. 
b. I don't accept my weakacsscs. 
23. a. Jn order to grow cmotion::dly, it is necessary 
to know why J act as I do. 
b. In order to grow emotionally. it is not neces-
sary to know why I act as I do. 
Z4. a. Som('times J am cross whe_n I am not feeling 
well. 
b. I am hardly e\'er cross . 
. , 
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25. a. It is necessary that othen; approve of what I 
do. 
b. It is not always necessary that others approve 
of what I do. 
26. a. I am afraid of making mist.~kes. 
b. I am not afraid of making mistakes. 
27. a. I trust the decisions I make spontaneously. 
b. I do not tr us t l h c d cc i s i o n s I make 
spontaneously. 
28. a. Myfeclingsofsclf-worth dqiend on how much 
I accomplish. 
b. My frclings of self-worth do not depend on 
how much I accomplish. 
2!l, a. I fear failure. 
b. I don't fear failure. 
:JO. a. My moral values arc determined, for the 
mo:'t part, by the thoughts, feelings and de-
cisions of others.· 
b. My moral vnlucs arc not determined, for the 
most part, by the thoughts, focling-s and de-
cisions of others. 
31. a. It is possible to li,·c life. in terms of what I 
want to do. 
b. It is not possil>le to live life in terms of what 
I want to do. 
32. a. I can cope with the ups and downs of life. 
b. I cannot copv with lhe ups and do\vns of lcfe. 
;ia. a. I hl'lieve in saying what J feel in dealing with 
others. 
b. I do not believe in saying what I feel in deal-
ing with others. 
:l·L a. Children should rcalit.c that they do not ha,·c 
the san1c rishts and priviluges as adults. 
b. It is not 1mport.~nt to make an issue of rights 
and privikges. 
:1:J. a. I ca11 "stick my nl'Ck out" in my relations with 
othl'l"S. 
h. I avoid ''sticking- my nt•ck out" in my relations 
with othl·rs. 
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36. a. I bf' Ii eve the pursuit of self-interest is op-
posed to intPrest in others. 
b. I believe the pursuit of self-interest is not 
opposed to interest in others. 
37. a. I find that I have rcject<:>cl many of the moral 
values I was U1ught. 
b. I have not rf'jecterl any of the moral values I 
was taught. 
38. a. I live in terms of my wants, likes, dislikes 
and values. 
b. I do not live in terms of my wants, likes, dis-
likes and values. 
39. a. I trust my ability to size up a situation. 
b. I do not trust my ability to size up a situation. 
40. a. I be licve I have an innate capncity to cope 
with life. 
b. I do not believe I have an innate capacity to 
cope with life. 
41. a. I must justify my actions in the pursuit of my 
own interests. 
b. I need not justify my actions in the pursuit of 
my own interests. 
42. a. I am bothered by fears of being inadequate. 
b. Iamnotbotheredbyfears of being inadequate. 
43. a. I believe that man is essentially good and can 
be trusted. 
b. I believe that man is essentially evil and can-
not be trusted. 
44. a. I live by the rules and standards of society. 
b. I do not always need to li\'e by the rules.and 
standards of society. 
45. a. I am .bound by my duties and obligations to 
others. 
b. I am not bound by my duties and obligations 
to others. 
46. a. Reasons are needed lo justify my feelings. 
b. Reasons arc not needed to justify my feelings. 
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47. a. There arc times when just being silent is the 
best way I can express my feelings. 
b. I find it difficult to express my feelings by 
just being silent.-
48. a. I often feel it necessary to defend my past 
actions. 
b. I do not feel it necessary to defend my past 
actions. 
49. a. I like everyone I know. 
b. I do not like everyone I know. 
50. a. Criticism thrl'atens my self-esteem. 
b. Criticism does not threaten my self-esteem. 
51. a. I believe that knowledge of what is right makes 
people act right. 
b. I do not believe that knowledge of what is right 
necessarily makes people act right. 
52. a. I am afraid to be angry at those I love. 
b. I feel free to be angry at those I love. 
53. a. My basic responsibility is to be aware of my 
own needs. 
b. My basic responsibility is to be aware of 
others' needs. 
5·1. a. Impressing others is most important. 
b. Expressing myself is most important. 
0>5. a. To feel right, l nL·ed alwa~·s to please others. 
b. lcanfcelrightwithoutalwa·ys having to please 
otlwrs. 
56. a. I wi II risk a friendship in order to say or do 
what I bclicn• is right. 
b. I will not risk a fricnuship just to say or do 
what is right. 
'i7. a. I foe! Lound to keep the prorniscs I make. 
b. I do not always led bow1d to kc·c·p tlw promises 
I nwkl'. 
G~. a. I must avoid sorrow at all costs. 
\J. It i~ not IH.'ct:ssary for n1e lo avoid surrO\\', 
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59. a. I strive always to predict what will happen in 
the future. 
b. I do. not feel it necessary always to predict 
what will happen in the future. 
60. a. It is important that others accept my point of 
view. 
b. It is not necessary for others to accept my 
point of view. 
61. a. I only fee I free to express warm feelings to 
my friends. 
b. l feel free to express both warm and hostile 
feelings to my friends. 
62. a. There are many times when it is more im-
portant to express feelings than to carefully 
evaluate the situation. 
b. There are very few times when it is more im-
portant to express feelings than to carefully 
evaluate the situation. 
63. a. I welcome criticism as an opportm1ity for 
growth. 
b. I do not welcome criticism as an opportunity 
for growth. 
64. a. Appearances are all-important. 
b. Appearances arc not terribly important. 
65. a. I hardly ever gossip. 
b. I gossip a little at times. 
66. a, I feel free to reveal my weaknesses among 
friends. 
b. I do not feel free to reveal my weaknesses 
among friends. 
67. a. I should always assume responsibility for. 
other people's feelings. 
b. l need not always assume responsibility for 
other people's fee lings. 
6 8. a. I fee l fr c e to be my s e If and bear the 
consequences. 
b. I do not fl'el free to be myself and bc:ir the 
conscquc·nc:es. 
GO 0:\ TO_.Tl!E :\EXT PAGE 
69. a. I already know a II I ncl'd to know about my 
feelings. 
b. As life goes on, I continue to know more and 
more about my feelings. 
70. a. I hesitate to show my weaknesses among 
strangers. 
b. I do not hesitate to show my weaknesses 
among strangers. 
71. a. I will continue to grow only by setting my 
sights ona high-level, socially approved goal. 
b. I will continue to grow best by being myself. 
72. a. I accept inconsisten~ic·s within myself. 
b. lc~rnnot accept inconsistencies within myself. 
73. a. Man is naturally cooperative. 
b. Man is naturally antagonistic. 
74. a. I don't mind laughing at a dirty joke. 
b. I hardly ever laugh at a dirty joke. 
7G. a. Happiness is a by-product in human 
re la lions hips. 
b. Happiness is an end in human rebt10nships. 
76. a. I only feel free to show friendly feelings to 
strangers. 
b. I feel free to show both friendly and unfriendly 
feelings to strangers. 
77. a. I try to be sincere but I sometimes fail. 
b. I try to be sincere and I am sincere. 
78. a. Self-interest ·is natural. 
b. Self-interest is unnatural. 
79. a. A neutral party can nwasure a happy relation-
ship by ol.Jsenation. 
b. A neutrctJ party caru1ot measure a happy rela-
tionship by ohservat ion. 
80. a. For me, work hnd pl:i.v art• thl' same. 
b. For llH', work and pla\· are oppositP.s. 
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81. a. Two people will get along best if each con-
centrates on plt•as ing the ulher. 
b. Two people can gc•l along best if each person 
feels free lo express himself. 
82. a. I have feelings of resentment about things that 
are past. 
Ii. I do not have feelings of resentment about 
things that arc past. 
83. a. I like only mas e u line men and feminine 
women. 
b. I like men and women who show masculinity 
as "".ell as femininity. 
84. a. I actively attempt to avoid embarrassment 
whenever I can. 
b. I do not actindy attempt to avoid 
embarrassment. 
85. a. I blame my parents for a lot of my troubles. 
b. I do not blame my parents for my troubles. 
8G. a: !feel that a person should be silly only at the 
right time and place. 
b. I can be silly when l feel like it. 
.97. a. People should always repent their wrong-
doings. 
b. People need not a !ways repent their wrong-
doings. 
88. a. I worry about the future. 
b. I do not worry about the future. 
89. a. Kindness and ruthlessness must be opposites. 
b. Kindness and r u th I es s ne s s need not be 
opposites. 
90. a. I prefer to save good things for future use. 
b. I prefer to use good things now. 
91. a. People should always control their anger. 
b. People should express honestly-felt an,;er. 
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9'' a. The truly spiritual man is sometimes sensual. 
b. The truly spiritual man is never sensual. 
93. a. I am able to express my feelings even when 
they sometimes res u 1 t in undesirable 
consequences. 
b. lam unable to express my feelings if they are 
likely to result in undesirable consequences. 
94. a. I am often ashamed of some of the emotions 
that I feel bubbling up within me. 
b. I do not feel ashamed of my emotions. 
!l5. ::i •• lhavchndmysteriousorecstatic experiences. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
!l!l. 
JOO. 
b. I have never had mysterious or ecstatic 
experienc<•s. 
a. I am orthodoxly religious. 
b. I am not orthodoxly religious. 
a, I am completely free of guilt. 
b. I am not free of guilt. 
a. I have a problem in fusing sex and love. 
b. I have no problem in fusing sex and Jove. 
a. I enjoy ddaehment and privacy. 
b. 1 du not cnjov detachment and privacy. 
a. I fed dedicat<•ct to my work. 
b. I do not fC'el dedicated to my work. 
1111. a. I can expn:ss af!Pclion re;.'.;u·dless of whether 
it is retw·ncd. 
b. I cannot cxprt'ss affection unless I am sw·c it 
will be returned. 
JO~. a. J.i\·ing for the future is as 1r.1portant as li\·ing 
for the moment. 
b. Only !i\·ing for the moment is important. 
I o:i. a. lt is better to be yoursdf. 
b. lt ts better to be popular. 
ltH. ;1. \\'ishinp; ~.111d im;1~ining can be bad. 
L. \Vi:-;hing and !n1agining ~lrL' ~~lways good. 
105. a. I spend more time preparing to live. 
b. I spend more time actually living. 
106. a. I am loved because I give love. 
b. I am loved because I am lovable. 
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107. a. When I really love myseif, everybody will 
love me. 
b. When I really love myself, there will still be 
those who won't love me. 
108. a. I can let other people control me. 
b. I can let other people control me if I am sure 
they will not continue to control me. 
109. a. As they are, people sometimes annoy me. 
b. As they are, people do not annoy me. 
110. a. Livingforthefuturegives my life its primary 
meaning. 
b. Only when li\'ing for the future ties into living 
for the present does my life have meaning. 
111. a. lfollowdiligentlythemotto, "Don't waste your 
time." 
b. I do not feel bound by the motto, "Don't waste 
your time." 
112. a. What I ha,·e bPen in the past dictates the kind 
of person I will be. 
b. What I ha,·e been in the past does not neces-
sarily dictate the kind of person I will be. 
J 13. a. It is important to me how I li\'e in the here and 
now. 
b, It is of little importance to me how I live in 
the here and now. 
114. a. I have had an experience where life seemed 
JUSt pelicct. 
b. I ha\'e never had an experience where life 
seemed just perfect. 
115. a. Evil is the result of frustration in trying to 
be good. 
b. Evil is an intrinsic part of human nature which 
fights good. 
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1 Hi. ~1. A p~:rson c~111 cumplt•tt'ly ch:1n~~;t> his essential 
rt:ttUJ'l'. 
b. A person can nevl"r di:1nge his essential 
nature. 
117. a. I am afraid to be tender. 
b. I am not afraid to be tender. 
118. a. I am assertive and affirming. 
b. I am not assertive and affirming. 
I 19. a. Women should be trusting and yielding. 
b. Women should not be ti·usting and yielding. 
120. a. I see myself as others see me. 
b. I do not see mysell as others see me. 
121. a. It is a good idea to think about your greatest 
potential. 
u. A pc•rson who thinks al.Jout his greatest potcn-
tia l gets conceited. 
1 ·>·> a. l\kn should he assertive and affirming. 
b. l\!en should not be assc;·tive and affirming. 
12:l. :1. I am ab](> to risk being myself. 
l.J. I ;cn1 tiot aiJl<· to risk bc:ing myself. 
12·1. a. I fc·el till' need to be doing something signifi-
cant all ol the time. 
b. I do not feel the nePd to be doing something 
significant all of the time. 
1:!5 .. a. I suffer fron1 n1cn1or1L'S. 
b. I do not suffer from memories. 
I ~G. a. llll'n and women ·must bt: both yielding and 
asserti\·e. 
h. 111Pn and women must not be both yielcLng and 
:t~Sl'I"ll\'t.'. 
1:1. a. I likt•tCJ participatt· ;1c:ti\·el~· in inten~t: 
discu~:-;1u11-....:. 
h. 1 do nut likt• to 1mrtieip:1tt· ac-tivl'l:: in intc•n:--t' 
d!:il'll~> IU!h. 
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l~'-1. a. I am H 1 lf-sutlieic.'llt. 
b. I am not ~ell-suffici<•nt. 
129. a. I like to wi tb!ra\\' from others for extended 
periods of time. 
b. I do not like to withdraw from others for ex-
tendf>d p('riods of time. 
130. a. I always pla:; fair. 
b. Sometimes I chca t a little. 
131. a. Sometimes I feel so angry I want to destroy 
or hurt othci·s. 
b. I never feel so angry th::it I want to destroy or 
hurt others. 
132. a. I feel certain and secure in my relationships 
with others. 
b. I feel uncertain ancl insecure in my relation-
ships with others. 
13:l. a. I like to withdraw temporarily from others. 
134. 
135. 
13G. 
b. I do not like to withdraw temporarily from 
others. 
a. I can accept my mistakes. 
b. I cannot accept my mistakes. 
a. I fin cl some people who are stupid and 
uninteresting. 
b. I never find any people who are stupid and 
uninteresting. 
a. I regret my past. 
b. I do not regret my past. 
137. a. Being myself is helpful to others. 
b. Just being mysell is not helpful to others. 
13~. a. lh3H!hud moments of intens~ happiness wlwn 
I fdt l ikc I was ex per ienc ing a kind of ecstasy 
or bli::;s. 
b. I h:1\·t· not h:id monH·!;ts of intc:nse happi.nl'~·s 
wh<:n I felt like I w~1:-:. L'Xpt·rit:ncing a kind rJf 
Iii 1,,-. 
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J:!!I. a. l'L•oplt· h:iv,• an instinct for t>vil. 
I>. Ph>plt• do not h:lVl' ;1n instinct for evil. 
I ·Iii. a. For llH.', tlH' futun· usllally seems hopeful. 
b. Fui· nw, the future often seems hopeless. 
1 ·ll. a. l'c•oplc are ho th good and c·vil. 
b. People "1".' not bulh goocl and C\'il. 
l·l~. a. lily p:1st is a stepping. stone for the future. 
b. lily past is a handicap to my futUl'l'. 
11:1. :1. "Killing time" is a prolilcrn for me. 
b. "l\.1lling timt~" b not ~1 prublen1 for 111e. 
I l·I. ". F"r llll'. past, pres<'nt and future is Ill mean-
ingful en11t inuity. 
h. For me. till' presC'nt is an island. unrelated 
to the· Jl"st and future. 
1 ·l :;, :1. lily hopc• for tlw future t!cpenclo on ha'.·ing 
friends. 
h. lily hope• fo1· the futu1·c· dlll'S not depend on 
having fri<>nds. 
82 
14G. a. I can like people \\'ithout ha\'inr; tci approve 
of th<·m. 
b. I cannot like people unless I also appro,·c of 
them. 
147. a. People are basically good. 
b. People are not basically good. 
148. a. Ho!1esty is always the best policy. 
b. There are times when honesty is not the best 
policy. 
149. a. I can feel comfortable with less than a perfect 
performance. 
b. I feel uncomfortable with anything less than a 
perfect performance. 
150. a. I can o\·ercomc any obstacles as long as I be-
JiC\·e in myc;df. 
b. I caru10t overcome c\·ery obstacle even if I 
belie\'e in myself. 
APPENDIX C 
GROUP PERCEPTIONS TEST 
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I. Below are four items, consisting of pairs of words with opposite 
meanings. Please rate (X) how you see yourself in terms of these 
items. 
Self (Your Name) 
>i >i 
.-I .-I 
(!) >i >i (!) 
.µ 
.-I .-I .-I .µ 
m .µ m .µ m 
H ..c:: H ..c:: H 
>t (!) tr> .µ tr> CJ) :>., 
H 'O ·.-l ::l ·.-l 'O H 
CJ) 0 .-I CJ) .-I 0 CJ) 
:> a UJ i::: UJ s :> 
friendly hostile 
strong weak 
bad good 
passive active 
II. Now rate how you see the other members of the group. Be sure to 
write their names in the blank above each group of items. 
(Name 1) 
>t >i 
.-I .-I 
CJ) >t :>., CJ) 
.µ 
.-I .-I .-I .µ 
m .µ m .µ m 
H ..c:: H ..c:: H 
:>., CJ) tr> .µ tr> (!) >i 
H 'ti ·.-i ::l ·.-l 'O H 
CJ) 0 .-I CJ) .-I ~ CJ) :> s UJ i::: UJ :> 
friendly hostile 
strong weak 
bad good 
passive active 
(Name 2) 
:>., >i 
r-1 r-1 
CJ) >t >i CJ) 
.µ 
.-I r-1 r-1 .µ 
m .µ m .µ m 
H ..c:: H 
.g H >t CJ) tr> .µ CJ) >. 
H 'O ·.-l ::::s ·.-l 'O H 
CJ) ~ .-I CJ) .-I 0 CJ) :> Ul i::: UJ a :> 
friendly hostile 
strong weak 
bad good 
passive active 
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(Name 3) 
:;... :;... 
.-I .-I 
Q) :;... :;... Q) 
.µ r-i .-I .-I .µ 
tt1 .µ tt1 .µ tt1 
)...j ..c:: )...j ~ )...j :;... Q) 
°' 
.µ Q) :;... 
)...j "d ·ri ::I ·ri "d )...j 
Q) 0 .-I Q) .-I 0 (!) 
:> a Ul s:: Ul a :> 
friendly hostile 
strong weak 
bad good 
passive active 
III. Next, rate how you think the other members of the group each rated 
you. Be sure to write in their names in the blanks above each 
group of items. 
How (Name 1) rated you. 
:;... :>. 
.-I r-i 
Q) :;... :>. Q) 
.µ 
.-I .-I .-I .µ 
tt1 .µ tt1 .µ tt1 )...j 
..c:: )...j ..c:: )...j 
:>. Q) 
°' 
.µ 
°' 
Q) :>. H "d ·ri ::I ·ri "d H Q) ~ r-i Q) .-I 0 Q) :> Ul s:: Ul s :::. 
friendly hostile 
strong weak 
bad good 
passive active 
How (Name 2) rated you. 
:>. :;... 
.-I .-I 
Q) :>. :>. Q) 
.µ 
.-I .-I .-I .µ 
tt1 .µ tt1 .µ tt1 )...j ~ )...j ~ H :>. Q) .µ Q) ~ H 
'8 ·ri ::I ·ri "d (]) .-I (]) .-I 0 Q) 
> Ei Ul s:: Ul El > 
friendly hostile 
strong weak 
bad good 
passive active 
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How (Name 3) rated you. 
:>.. :>.. 
r-i r-i 
Q) :>.. :>.. Q) 
.µ r-i r-i r-i .µ 
n1 .µ n1 .µ n1 
H ..i:: H ..i:: H 
:>.. Q) 
°' 
.µ 
°' 
Q) :>.. 
H "d ·ri ::I ·ri "d H 
Q) g r-i Q) r-i 0 Q) :> ti) s:: ti) s :> 
friendly hostile 
strong weak 
bad good 
passive active 
IV. Finally, rate how you think the other members of the group rated 
him/herself. Be sure to write in their names in the blanks. 
How (Name 1) rated him/herself. 
:>.. :>.. 
r-i r-i 
Q) :>.. :>.. Q) 
.µ r-i r-i r-i .µ 
n1 .µ n1 .µ n1 
H 
.g, H .g, H :>.. Q) .µ Q) :>.. 
H "d ·ri ::I ·ri "d H 
Q) g r-i Q) r-i 0 Q) :> ti) s:: ti) s :> 
friendly hostile 
strong weak 
bad good 
passive active 
How (Name 2) rated him/herself. 
:>.. :>.. 
r-i r-i 
Q) :>.. :>.. Q) 
.µ r-i r-i r-i .µ 
n1 .µ n1 .µ n1 
H ..i:: H ..i:: H 
:>.. Q) 
°' 
.µ 
°' 
Q) :>.. H "d ·ri ::I ·ri "d H Q) 0 r-i Q) r-i g Q) :> s ti) s:: UJ :> 
friendly hostile 
strong weak 
bad good 
passive active 
How (Name 3) 
>. 
r-l 
Q) >. 
.µ r-l 
rt1 .µ 
i...i ..c: 
>. Q) 
°' i...i "d ·.-! Q) ~ r-l ::. Ul 
friendly 
strong 
bad 
passive 
>. 
r-l r-l 
rt1 .µ 
i...i ..c: 
.µ 
°' ::l ·.-! Q) r-l 
i::: Ul 
>. 
r-l 
Q) 
.µ 
rt1 
i...i 
Q) 
"d 
0 
s 
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rated him/herself. 
hostile 
weak 
good 
active 
APPENDIX D 
DERIVATION OF GROUP PERCEPTION MEASURES 
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Self Other (S2) (0 2/1, 0 2/3, 
(Sl) (O 1/2, 0 1/3, 0 2/4) 
0 1/4) 
Self as others Other's self as (SO 2/1, so 2/3, (OS 2/1, OS 2/3, 
see me he sees self so 2/4) OS 2/4) 
(So 1/2, so 1/3, (OS 1/2, OS 1/3, 
so 1/4) OS 1/4) 
(S3) (0 3/1, 0 3/2, (S4) (0 4/1, 0 4/2, 
0 3/4) 0 4/3) 
(SO 3/1, so 3/2, (OS 3/1, OS 3/2, (SO 4/1, so 4/2, (OS 4/1, OS 4/2, 
so 3/4) OS 3/4) so 4/3) OS 4/3_) 
1. Congruency: degree to which one rates others as they are perceived 
rating oneself (perceived behavior exchange). 
Sl = [O 1/2 - SO 1/2] + [O 1/3 - SO 1/3] + [O 1/4 - SO 1/4] • 
2. Mutuality: degree to which one rates others as they actually rate 
oneself (behavior exchange). 
Sl = [O 1/2 - 0 2/1] + [O 1/3 - 0 3/1] + [O 1/4 - 0 4/1]. 
3. Accuracy: degree to which a person can predict how others perceive 
him (self accuracy). 
Sl = [O 2/1 - SO 1/2] + [O 3/1 - SO 1/3] + [O 4/1 - SO 1/4]. 
4. Empathy: degree to which a person can predict how others see them-
selves (other accuracy). 
Sl = [OS 1/2 - S2] + [OS 1/3 - S3] + [OS 1/4 - S4]. 
5. Interpersonal Openness: degree to which others can predict your 
rating of them (reflects degree to which one is understood). 
Sl = [O 1/2 - SO 2/1] + [O 1/3 - SO 3/1] + [O 1/4 - SO 4/1] • 
6. Personal Openness: degree to which bthers can predict one's self 
concept (reflects degree to which one is understood). 
Sl = [OS 2/1 - Sl] + [OS 3/1 - Sl] + [OS 4/1 - Sl] • 
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7. Felt Openness: degree to which one predicts that others agree with 
one's self perception (reflects degree to which one feels under-
stood). 
Sl = [SO 1/2 - Sl] + [SO 1/3 - Sl] + [SO 1/4 - Sl]. 
8. Realism: degree to which one sees self as others see one (others' 
agreement with self concept). 
Sl = [Sl - 0 2/1] + [Sl - 0 3/1] + [Sl - 0 4/1]. 
APPENDIX E 
BASIC INSTRUCTION CARDS 
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Category L Any verbal expression of your current feelings resulting 
from interaction with the group. 
Category 2. Seeking information from another group member regarding 
his or her feelings. 
Category 3. Seeking information regarding your own behavior. 
Category 4. Statements ~o another group member regarding your percep-
tion of his behavior. 
Category 5. Any attempt to clarify the expressed feelings of another 
group member. 
_,-.;.f HERE & NOW 
APPENDIX F 
INSTRUCTIONS 
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Please listen carefully: This experiment is designed to help you 
get to know each other on a personal basis. We have found that the best 
way to get a genuine understanding of each other is to share your feel-
ings that come out of this current group situation. As an example, if 
another group member behaves so as to displease you, the most direct way 
of doing something about it is to tell him or her how you feel about 
their behavior. Because you can get bogged down in a discussion of past 
events, it is best to stick to "here and now" happenings. 
It might also help you to remember a couple of things about communi-
cation and getting close to others: (1) that perhaps the most important 
thing you can give another person is empathy and understanding, and this 
naturally makes others feel closer to you; and (2) that all of us do 
things to avoid genuinely personal interaction--such as speculating about 
"why?" someone said this or that, or engaging in small talk about academ-
ic majors, classifications, etc. 
These five sentences (at this time the experimenter points to the 
cards in front of each subject) break down into categories of what I am 
talking about. They are ways of interacting which have been shown to 
help people establish and maintain close relationships. They are: 
Category 1. Imy verbal expression of your current feelings result-
ing from interaction with the group. "It makes me feel good because 
you're interested" is an example that fits, while "I feel good because 
I just aced an exam" does not fit because it relates to something outside 
the group. 
Category 2. Seeking information from another group member regarding 
his or her feelings. For instance, "How did you feel when she ignored 
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you just then?". References to feelings outside the current situation 
such as, "Have you ever felt that way before?" do not fit this category. 
Category 3. Seeking information regarding your own behavior. A 
question like, "Is my talking a lot bothering you?" fits, while "Do 
people who talk a lot bother you?" does not because it refers to people 
in general and not your specific behavior. 
Category 4. Statements to another group member regarding your per-
ception of his ~her behavior. For example, "I think that was really 
an intelligent comment." An example that would not fit is "He's really 
coming on strong," because it is not made directly to the person being 
discussed. 
Category 5. Any attempt to clarify the expressed feelings of 
another. "Are you saying that you feel better now?" is a good example, 
but "Yeah, I guess I see what you mean to say" does not fit because it 
does not clarify a feeling. 
You can see that all of these categories apply to the current situ-
ation, the things you will do and say in this room. And they are about 
feelings, not abstract ideas. So, what I am asking you to do is to 
interact with each other for 60 minutes while keeping in mind and using 
these categories. 
I will monitor the group through the one-way mirror and the micro-
phone. What you say will be recorded, but will be kept completely confi-
dential. It will be used only in this experiment, then erased. 
(FOR REINFORCEMENT SESSIONS) 
(This was read just before the above paragraph concerning monitor-
ing.) You have undoubtedly noticed these boxes, and have probably won-
dered why they are here. Well, whenever any of you makes a statement 
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that fits any one of these five categories, I will activate the counter 
in front of that person. It makes an audible click, and this will let 
you know how well you are using these categories in your interaction. 
This counter will register your total, and if anyone falls too far be-
hind, the red light above his counter will come on. This will be a sign 
that this person may need assistance, or that one person is tending to 
dominate the conversation. Another important sign for you is this: if 
no one gets a click for three minutes, all of your lights will flash on, 
and they will do so every three minutes until a click is registered. 
This will indicate to you that the group as a whole is not using the 
categories, and that you all should change how you are interacting with 
each other. 
Now, I know that this apparatus may seem artificial to you, but it 
is the least distracting, nondisruptive method that we have found to give 
you information about how you are interacting, while you are interacting. 
Instructions for Acquisitions 1 and 2 
Let me remind you that the purpose of the study is to get to know 
each other on a personal basis. I am asking you to accomplish this by 
using these five categories (pointing to cards). (Here categories were 
read as above.) Again today, we will use the feedback procedure so as 
not to interrupt the flow of interaction. Is everything clear? (The 
sentence concerning the apparatus was of course omitted for the nonrein-
forcement groups.) 
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TABLE VII 
TIME RATIO (SCALE NO. 1) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.85 
Gl/yes-no 1 1.56 
Sessions 1 7.62** 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.62 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 1.91 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 0.09 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 1 1.15 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
**p < .01. 
TABLE VIII 
SUPPORT RATIO (SCALE NO. 2) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 1.56 
Gl/yes-no 1 2.43 
Sessions 1 15.32** 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.76 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 0.23 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 0.05 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 1 0.54 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
**p < . 01. 
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TABLE IX 
SELF-ACTUALIZING VALUE (SCALE NO. 3) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.52 
Gl/yes'-no 1 0.64 
Sessions 1 5.69** 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.24 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 0.01 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 2.05 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 1 5.69** 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
**p < .05. 
TABLE X 
EXISTENTIALITY (SCALE NO. 4) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.00 
Gl/yes-no 1 1.09 
Sessions 1 26.26*** 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.05 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 0.04 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 2. 77 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 1 0.36 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
***p < . 01. 
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TABLE XI 
FEELING REACTIVITY (SCALE NO. 5) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 1.96 
Gl/yes-no 1 2.60 
Sessions 1 0.40 
Reinf orcemen't by Gl/yes-no 1 0.03 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 3.57* 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 0.66 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 1 3.57* 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
*p < .10. 
TABLE XII 
SPONTANEITY (SCALE NO. 6) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.02 
Gl/yes-no 1 0.05 
Sessions 1 0.01 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.05 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 3.07* 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 1.10 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by sessions 1 2.30 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
*p < .10. 
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TABLE XIII 
SELF-REGARD (SCALE NO. 7) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.01 
Gl/yes-no 1 o.oo 
Sessions 1 7.51** 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 1.00 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 0.04 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 0.18 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 1 1.60 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
**p < .05. 
TABLE XIV 
SELF-ACCEPTANCE (SCALE NO. 8) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 1.00 
Gl/yes-no 1 4.66** 
Sessions 1 6.15** 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 1.92 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 o.oo 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 0.13 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 1 2.79 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
**p < .05. 
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TABLE XV 
NATURE OF MAN (SCALE NO. 9) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 5.33** 
Gl/yes-no 1 0.82 
Sessions 1 2.78 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.09 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 2.78 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 0.51 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 1 0.06 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
**p < .05. 
TABLE XVI 
SYNERGY (SCALE NO. 10) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 1.65 
Gl/yes-no 1 3.52* 
Sessions 1 6.70** 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.09 
Reinforcement by Sessions 1 0.02 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 1 0.14 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 1 1.23 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
*p < .10; **p < .05. 
TABLE XVII 
ACCEPTANCE OF AGGRESSION (SCALE NO. 11) 
Source df 
Reinforcement l 
Gl/yes-no l 
sessions l 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no l 
Reinforcement by Sessions l 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions l 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions l 
Subjects by Sessions 20 
*p < .10. 
TABLE XVIII 
CAPACITY FOR INTIMATE CONTACT 
(SCALE NO. 12) 
Source 
Reinforcement 
Gl/yes-no 
Sessions 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
Reinforcement by Sessions 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 
Subjects 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 
Subjects by Sessions 
**p < .05. 
df 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
20 
l 
20 
F 
3.03* 
0.21 
2.88 
0.06 
0.53 
0.12 
0.00 
F 
0.12 
2.44 
4.60** 
1.33 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
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ANOVA SUMMARY TABLES FOR EIGHT 
GROUP PERCEPTION MEASURES 
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TABLE XIX 
CONGRUENCY (MEASURE NO. 1) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.11 
Gl/yes-no 1 O.lS 
Sessions 2 O.S2 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.07 
Reinforcement by Sessions 2 3.40** 
Gl/yes-no Sessions 2 1.43 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 2 0.20 
Subjects by Sessions 40 
**p < .OS. 
TABLE XX 
MUTUALITY (MEASURE NO. 2) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.21 
Gl/yes-no l 0.08 
Sessions 2 3.11 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 1.26 
Reinforcement by Sessions 2 S.45** 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 2 0.49 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 2 0.74 
Subjects by Sessions 40 
**p < .OS. 
TABLE XXI 
ACCURACY (MEASURE NO. 3) 
Source df 
Reinforcement· 1 
Gl/yes-no 1 
Sessions 2 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 
Reinforcement by Sessions 2 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 2 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 2 
Subjects by Sessions 40 
TABLE XXII 
EMPATHY (MEASURE NO. 4) 
Source 
Reinforcement 
Gl/yes-no 
Sessions 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
Reinforcement by sessions 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 
Subjects 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 
Subjects by Sessions 
**p < .05. 
df 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
20 
2 
40 
F 
0.41 
0.00 
1. 78 
1.93 
0.97 
1.57 
0.67 
F 
0.34 
0.38 
3.65** 
0.03 
2.26 
0.50 
0.04 
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TABLE XXIII 
INTERPERSONAL OPENNESS (MEASURE NO. 5) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.00 
Gl/yes-no 1 0.37 
Sessions 2 1.17 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.26 
Reinforcement by Sessions 2 2.32 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 2 0.84 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 2 0.39 
Subjects by Sessions 40 
TABLE XXIV 
PERSONAL OPENNESS (MEASURE NO. 6) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.01 
Gl/yes-no 1 0.01 
Sessions 2 0.50 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.13 
Reinforcement by Sessions 2 2.83* 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 2 0.21 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 2 1.97 
Subjects by Sessions 40 
*p < .10. 
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TABLE XXV 
FELT OPENNESS (MEASURE NO. 7) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 2.49 
Gl/yes-no 1 0.22 
Sessions 2 0.87 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.18 
Reinforcement by Sessions 2 0.37 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 2 2.10 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 2 0.00 
Subjects by Sessions 40 
TABLE XXVI 
REALISM (MEASURE NO. 8) 
Source df F 
Reinforcement 1 0.02 
Gl/yes-no 1 0.56 
Sessions 2 3.92** 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 1 0.00 
Reinforcement by Sessions 2 0.65 
Gl/yes-no by Sessions 2 0.86 
Subjects 20 
Reinforcement by Gl/yes-no 
by Sessions 2 0.59 
Subjects by Sessions 40 
*p < .OS. 
APPENDIX I 
NEWMAN-KEULS COMPARISON OF MEANS FROM FIVE GROUP 
PERCEPTION MEASURES TAKEN AT Al, A3 AND G2 
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RAl = 19.75 
RG2 = 20.83 
NRA3 ::: 21.92 
NRG2 24.67 
NRAl = 31.2S 
RA3 = 32.08 
*p < .OS. 
NRG2 = 30.17 
RG2 31. 7S 
RAl = 32.08 
NRA3 = 35.17 
RA3 = 46.17 
NRAl = 53.83 
*p < .OS. 
RAl RG2 
1.08 
NRG2 RG2 
l.S8 
TABLE XXVII 
CONGRUENCY 
NRA3 
2.17 
1.09 
TABLE XXVIII 
MUTUALITY 
RAl 
1.91 
.33 
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NRG2 NRAl RA3 
4.92* 11. 50* 12.33* 
3.84* 10.42* 11. 25* 
2.75 9.33* 10.06* 
6.58* 7.41* 
.83 
NRA3 RA3 NRAl 
5.00* 16.00* 23.66* 
3.42 15.42* 22.08* 
3.09* 14.09* 21. 75* 
11.00* 18.66* 
7.66* 
NRG2 
NRG2 = 15.83 
RG2 = 22.67 
RA3 = 24.17 
RAl 24.83 
NRA3 = 30.75 
NRAl = 32.42 
*p < .05. 
NRG2 
NRG2 = 15.83 
RA3 = 24.33 
RAl = 24.83 
NRA3 = 30.42 
RG2 = 31.00 
NRAl = 32.17 
*p < .05. 
RG2 
6.84* 
TABLE XXIX 
EMPATHY 
RA3 
8.34* 
1.50 
RAl 
9.00* 
2.16 
.66 
TABLE XXX 
PERSONAL OPENNESS 
RA3 RAl NRA3 
8.50* 9.00* 14.59* 
.50 6.09* 
5.59* 
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NRA3 NRAl 
14.82* 16.59* 
8.08* 9.75* 
5.58* 8.25* 
5.82* 7.59* 
1.67 
RG2 NRAl 
15.17* 16.34* 
6.67* 7.84* 
6.17* 7.34* 
.58 1. 75 
1.17 
NRG2 RG2 
NRG2 = 18.17 2.16 
RG2 21.33 
RAl = 26.50 
NRA3 = 29.42 
RA3 29.50 
NRAl = 32.25 
*p < .05. 
TABLE XXXI 
REALISM 
RAl 
8.33* 
5.17* 
NRA3 
11. 25* 
8.09* 
2.92 
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RA3 NRAl 
11. 33* 14.08* 
8.17* 10.92* 
3.00 5.75* 
.08 2.83 
2.75 
~x 
VITA 
Ronald Dean Duvall 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis: GROUP MODIFICATION OF AFFECTIVE VERBALIZATIONS AND EXTENDED 
GENERALIZATION EFFECTS 
Major Field: Psychology 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Hulbert, Oklahoma, August 17, 1946, the son 
of Mr. and Mrs. F. A. Duvall. Married, wife Kevin Cossey 
Duvall. 
Education: Graduated from Muskogee Central High School, Muskogee, 
Oklahoma, May, 1963; received Bachelor of Arts degree in 
Psychology and Sociology from Northeastern Oklahoma State Uni-
versity, May, 1972; received Master of Science degree in 
Psychology from Oklahoma State University, July, 1974; com-
pleted requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in 
Psychology at Oklahoma State University, December, 1977. 
Teaching and Professional Experience: National Institute of Mental 
Health traineeship, 1973 to 1974; teaching assistant, College 
of Arts and Sciences, 1973 to 1974, and 1975 to 1976; clinical 
psychology internship at Seattle Veteran's Administration 
Hospital, Seattle, Washington, 1976 to 1977. 
